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Can We Rehabilitate the Guilds? A Sceptical Re-Appraisal1 
 
A guild is an association formed by a group of people who regard themselves as sharing some 
common characteristic and wish to pursue some common purpose. The characteristics uniting 
guild members might be as various as residential propinquity within a town, religious 
observance, or alien geographical origin. In Europe, however, by far the most frequently 
observed characteristic around which guilds were formed was occupation, and the commonest 
type of guilded occupation was manufacturing. Throughout the medieval and early modern 
periods, most European craftsmen and even many export-oriented proto-industrial producers 
organized themselves into guilds. The typical guild, therefore, was a craft guild – a local 
association among the independent practitioners in a particular branch of industry in a 
particular locality, usually centred in a town but often including surrounding rural areas. 
Some craft guilds pursued religious, cultural, social, and political activities, but all craft guilds 
pursued economic ones. The one universal purpose uniting members of any European craft 
guild was to obtain charters and ordinances from the political authorities endowing its 
members with exclusive rights to practise a particular industrial occupation and to enjoy 
privileged access to its input and output markets.  
 
The craft guild was one of the most widespread institutions in Europe from the Middle Ages 
to the Industrial Revolution. Although it began to break down in some European societies as 
early as the sixteenth century, it survived in others well into the nineteenth century. Its 
widespread existence and long survival raise the question of why it existed, what impact it 
had on European economic development, and whether it provides any insights into the 
institutional sources of economic well-being more widely. 
 
For as long as guilds have existed, people have been divided about the impact they exerted on 
the economy. Contemporaries already held strong views about guilds, with mercantilists and 
cameralists such as Colbert and Becher regarding them as essential for national industrial 
development while early political economists such as De la Court, Childs, Smith, and Turgot 
advanced more critical assessments. Historians, too, have been deeply divided on the 
question, with some arguing that guilds exercised harmful monopolies, others that guilds were 
economically powerless, and still others that guilds were positively beneficial.2  
 
The traditional historiography on guilds consisted mainly of economic historians criticizing 
the monopolistic regulations in guild charters, and social historians celebrating guilds’ 
contribution to pre-modern social solidarity – two perspectives that seldom intersected. In 
recent decades, however, these views have been brought together by a group of scholars who 
use arguments derived from a particular strand of economics to buttress their favourable view 
of guilds as social institutions. These scholars argue that the craft guild was so widespread 
and long-lived that it must have been an efficient solution to economic problems facing early 
modern industries.3 According to one such enthusiast, ‘Guilds were not in fact the rent-
seeking organizations bound by tradition and against technological change painted by their 
Liberal critics, but flexible and adaptable associations ...’.4  
 
These scholars have sought not only to downplay the negative effects of guild monopolies and 
rent-seeking, but to make a positive case for guilds as solutions to market failures. Some 
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adherents of this view have argued that guilds existed to solve asymmetries of information 
between producers, merchants, and consumers concerning product quality, thereby increasing 
the volume of exchange and enabling industries to expand over larger spatial areas.5 Others 
have claimed that guilds existed to overcome imperfections in markets for trained labour, 
thereby both increasing the volume of exchange and improving industrial productivity.6 Still 
others have contended that guilds existed because they were an efficient institutional solution 
to imperfections in markets for technological innovations, creating incentives for innovators 
to invent new ideas and disseminate their innovations more widely.7 Guilds persisted so 
widely and for so long, these scholars argue, because they were economically efficient 
institutions. 
 
At the same time, some political scientists have begun to adduce guilds as historical 
exemplars of ‘social networks’ which generated beneficial ‘social capital’ for the economy as 
a whole. Thus a final and more general version of the case for the economic benefits of guilds 
has claimed that they created social capital by sustaining shared norms, punishing violators of 
these norms, effectively transmitting information, and successfully undertaking collective 
action. This in turn is supposed to have heightened the overall level of trust in the society, 
causing markets and governments to function better and benefiting aggregate economic 
growth and social well-being.8  
 
In a series of publications over the last decade or so, I have argued that these teleological 
views of guilds as efficient and beneficial economic institutions are flawed. Empirically, they 
have relied mainly on legislative or literary sources, often assembled impressionistically from 
the secondary literature on a wide array of different societies and time periods.9 Theoretically, 
their arguments are contradictory and uncorroborated. Detailed case studies of what particular 
guilds actually did, combined with cross-European comparisons on an industry-by-industry 
basis, indicate strongly that guild rent-seeking and monopolies were a major source of market 
failure in pre-modern economies. The widespread persistence of guilds was caused not by 
their efficiency, but by the fact that they redistributed resources in ways that benefited the 
powerful.10 This more sceptical view of pre-modern guilds, as I have pointed out, is supported 
by empirical findings from outside the guilds debate, including much of the literature on the 
history of technology,11 women’s work,12 migration,13 Jewish occupations,14 illegitimacy,15 
and economic marginalization.16 
 
Enthusiasts for guilds, however, continue to claim that their favourable economic assessment 
of pre-modern guilds has turned into a ‘modern consensus’ from which there can no longer be 
any deviation. In December 2006, a conference was held at Utrecht on ‘The Return of the 
Guilds’, at which criticisms of guilds were almost universally dismissed in favour of a new 
orthodoxy, according to which guilds were described as flexible and well-functioning 
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institutions which benefited pre-industrial European economies and societies.17 A recent 
article by one member of this group, Epstein, explicitly criticizes my more sceptical 
assessment of guilds, thereby seeking to re-establish the claim that guilds’ aggregate benefits 
outweighed their costs.18  
 
This suggests that the time is ripe for a renewed and critical assessment of the economic 
debate about guilds. This is the more important in that the discussion seems to be becoming 
bogged down in the issue of whether one is ‘for’ or ‘against’ guilds. But this is not the basic 
question. Rather, the important challenge is that of explaining how European economies first 
escaped from poverty and stagnation, and thus of understanding the institutional constraints 
on economic growth more widely. To do so requires that we apply to our examination of 
European guilds both rigorous empirical analyses of how these institutions worked in practice 
and a critical theoretical consideration of what causes economic institutions to arise and 
survive. 
 
This paper seeks to begin this process by examining the claims advanced in Epstein’s paper, 
as well as other recent re-statements of the view that guilds were beneficial economic 
institutions. It begins, in Section 1, by examining the precise claims that enthusiasts for guilds 
advance concerning the aggregate impact of these institutions on the pre-modern economy. 
Focussing specific attention on claims that guilds were ‘efficient’ or ‘optimal’, it explores 
what it means to argue that the aggregate economic benefits of guilds outweighed their costs, 
and examines the implications of making that claim for any institution – a theme which is 
revisited in the methodological discussion in Section 7. 
 
Section 2 then turns to the first major argument advanced in favour of guilds as beneficial 
economic institutions – that they overcame asymmetries of information and problems of 
delegated monitoring concerning product quality. It asks what economic theory tells us about 
guild quality controls, whether legislative evidence is adequate to demonstrate that guilds 
benefited quality, what precisely can be deduced from the fact that some guilds imposed 
numerous penalties on quality violations, and whether available evidence – including the 
findings of my German case study – can be reinterpreted in such a way as to rehabilitate 
guilds’ role in quality control. 
 
Section 3 investigates the second argument often advanced to support the view that guilds 
were beneficial economic institutions – their role in human capital investment. It critically 
examines recent claims that cognitive psychology can demonstrate that guilds were essential 
for ensuring skilled training in pre-modern crafts. It then asks if legislative evidence can be 
used to establish that craft training required guild regulation, if guilds’ exclusion of females 
from industrial training can be dismissed as having no deleterious economic impact, and if the 
absence of apprenticeships in many successful pre-modern crafts can somehow be 
reinterpreted to support the view that guilds were essential. It then addresses the claim, 
advanced in Epstein’s recent paper, that evidence that guild training was unnecessary derives 
solely from a single branch of manufacturing, the worsted textile industry analysed in my case 
study. In concludes by investigating whether European evidence can be reinterpreted in such a 
way as to establish that guilds were essential for human capital investment in the centuries 
before the Industrial Revolution. 
 
Section 4 explores the third argument advanced by enthusiasts for guilds – that guilds 
encouraged technological innovation. It begins by asking whether guilds’ widespread 
opposition to new techniques and practices can be dismissed as economically harmless. It 
then examines the quality of the evidence adduced in support of the view of some enthusiasts, 
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that guilds positively encouraged innovation by encouraging the transfer of ‘embodied’ 
technical knowledge. It addresses the claim, advanced in Epstein’s paper, that evidence from 
my empirical case study of the German territory of Württemberg can be reinterpreted to show 
that guilds actually encouraged innovation. Finally, it examines whether cross-European 
comparisons can be interpreted to rehabilitate guilds as having played a positive role in 
technological progress before factory industrialization. 
 
Section 5 discusses the phenomenon of guild rent-seeking. Even scholars who wish to argue 
that guilds were economically beneficial acknowledge that they engaged in rent-seeking, 
investing resources in obtaining legal monopolies and other economic privileges from the 
political authorities. Monopolies cause deadweight losses to the economy and rent-seeking 
activities consume resources that could otherwise have been used for productive purposes. 
This section begins by examining the argument, advanced by enthusiasts for guilds, that the 
welfare loss from guild rent-seeking was quantitatively trivial and cannot have inflicted 
significant harm on the pre-modern economy. The section then investigates the more extreme 
claim, advanced in the recent paper by Epstein, that guild rent-seeking was positively 
beneficial for early modern European economic development. 
 
Section 6 examines differences in the strength of guilds and the success of industry across 
pre-industrial Europe. Scholars concerned to argue that guilds were beneficial have sought to 
dismiss the harmful activities of strong guilds, such as those revealed in my German case 
study, as atypical. This section therefore begins by investigating how widespread such strong 
guilds were in pre-modern Europe and whether the degree and type of economic regulation 
they exercised was indeed atypical. Enthusiasts for guilds are also concerned to establish that 
strong guilds were associated with successful economies, and hence that, counter to the 
existing historiography, English and Dutch guilds were especially strong by European 
standards. This section investigates whether such arguments can be supported by the 
empirical findings. 
 
The paper concludes, in Section 7, by considering the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings of arguments that guilds were beneficial, and suggests that they are lacking in 
coherence. It examines whether enthusiasts for guilds are justified in criticizing the 
methodology of the in-depth empirical case study or the cross-country comparison among 
industries. It also analyses the tenability of the alternative approach they advocate, in 
particular the ‘efficiency’ view of economic institutions. It concludes that much remains to be 
discovered about guilds and their role in European economic development. But to do so, this 
paper argues, requires us to replace the desire to view traditional institutions as beneficial and 
efficient with a more critical and balanced exploration of how they behaved in practice and 
how they affected pre-modern economies. 
 
1. What Does It Mean to Say That Guilds Were Efficient? 
 
Let us begin by examining what exactly is claimed by scholars who are enthusiastic about the 
benefits of guilds. The view that guilds existed so widely and for such a long time because 
they corrected failures in markets for product quality, skilled training, and technological 
innovation certainly appears to imply a belief that guilds were economically efficient 
institutions. But some enthusiasts for guilds object to the idea that they are asserting that 
guilds were efficient. Thus Epstein, in his recent paper, denies having argued ‘that guilds 
were “efficient” institutions’, on the grounds that he had never claimed ‘that guilds were 
socially optimal’.19 
 
But this is based on a confusion between economic efficiency and social equity. It is 
understandable that enthusiasts for guilds should deny claiming that guilds were ‘socially 
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optimal’ institutions (i.e. ones that accorded with acceptable levels of distributional justice). 
As has been demonstrated in innumerable analyses, guilds used their monopoly privileges to 
overcharge customers, underpay employees and suppliers, and exclude potential competitors, 
thereby redistributing resources to relatively well-off guild masters at the expense of 
consumers and poorer social groups such as women, labourers, and migrants.20 But whether 
economic arrangements result in a socially equitable distribution is a separate issue from 
whether such arrangements are efficient. A set of economic arrangements is Pareto-efficient if 
there is no feasible alternative set of arrangements that can make some individual better off 
without another being made worse off. An improvement in efficiency involves a change that 
benefits at least one individual without harming any others. Since this concept of efficiency 
relates only to changes in which there are no losers, it is silent about distributional trade-offs. 
In practice, it is difficult to make changes in economic arrangements that do not involve both 
gainers and losers, so the concept of efficiency is often interpreted in terms of the gainers 
being able in principle to compensate the losers and still be better off after the change. On this 
interpretation, an institution is efficient if there is no feasible alternative institution such that 
the gains of those who would benefit from the alternative exceed the losses of those who are 
harmed by it. 
 
It is important to note that minimizing the costs of economic activity (producing and 
transacting) is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for economic efficiency. For example, 
a monopoly may produce its output at minimum cost, but the outcome is not efficient because 
the price charged to consumers exceeds the marginal cost of production. Ending the 
monopoly would increase efficiency because the gains to consumers exceed the losses of the 
monopolist, and thus in principle the consumers can compensate the monopolist for the lost 
monopoly profits and still be better off. 
 
The publications of most scholars who are enthusiastic about guilds suggest that they are at 
least claiming that guilds minimized the costs of economic activity, and in some cases are 
making the wider claim that guilds’ aggregate benefits outweighed their aggregate costs. Thus 
Hickson and Thomson offer an ‘efficiency-based theory of the social function of entry-
restricting guilds’ as cost-minimizing institutions for protecting members from opportunistic 
exploitation, collecting capital taxes, and ensuring provision of military protection.21 
Gustafsson argues that medieval craft guilds were an efficient solution to asymmetries of 
information between producers and consumers about product quality.22 Pfister claims that 
craft guilds helped ensure quality control in proto-industries where production was 
geographically dispersed, and also provided an efficient solution to credit-market 
imperfections.23 Reith contends that guilds were an efficient mechanism for transferring 
advanced knowledge and skills among different localities through journeymen’s travels.24 
Mocarelli argues that Italian and Spanish guilds were ‘extremely efficient, thus guaranteeing 
their survival over a period of several centuries’,25 and that as late as the final years of the 
eighteenth century, guilds were ‘a still efficient organization’ which protected customers, 
stabilized markets, and reduced transaction and organization costs.26 Van Zanden argues that 
‘the efficiency of the guilds’ in providing skilled training helped Europe surpass Asia in the 
early modern period.27 Persson claims that craft guilds provided a bargaining mechanism 
whereby ‘collusion was institutionalized into co-operation based on a balance of rights and 
obligations’, transaction costs were reduced through the regulation of prices and qualities, 
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entitlement crises were mitigated by rationing, and implicit insurance was provided to guild 
members by reducing competition. While admitting that we cannot be certain that this was 
efficient ‘because we do not have straightforward efficiency results for bargaining outcomes’, 
he nonetheless concludes that guild institutions were ‘adequate and even progressive’.28  
 
Even those who most vehemently deny advancing an efficiency view of guilds give every 
evidence of doing so. Thus Epstein, in an article of 1998, asserts that craft guilds existed 
because they were the best institution ‘to allocate skilled labor efficiently’29 and ‘to provide 
an ideal market structure for innovation’.30 In an article of 2004, he states that the purpose of 
guild-mandated tramping by journeymen was ‘to coordinate information and allocate skilled 
labour more efficiently across regions’.31 In a recent reiteration of these arguments, he argues 
that ‘the extraordinary longevity of the craft guild’ can be explained by its ‘functional 
complexity and flexibility’ in solving information asymmetries, providing capital, enforcing 
quality, and ensuring skilled training.32 Guilds, he claims, ‘offered a superior organizational 
matrix for the acquisition of skills by most urban artisans working under the prevailing 
technological, commercial and political circumstances’.33 He summarizes his position by 
stating that guilds’ ‘aggregate social benefits outweighed their costs’.34 This statement is 
essentially the view that guilds were efficient not just in the limited sense that they minimized 
the costs of economic activity, but in the broader sense that the gainers from guilds would 
have been in principle able to compensate the losers and still be better off. That is, it amounts 
to the claim that guilds satisfied the conditions for potential Pareto-efficiency. 
 
To reach a balanced assessment of the craft guild as an economic institution, it is important to 
be clear about what is implied by the assertion that they were ‘efficient’ or that their aggregate 
social benefits outweighed their costs. Epstein’s recent paper claims that critics of guilds 
adopt ‘a public choice perspective that assumes that historical markets are deviations from a 
hypothetical competitive optimum’.35 On the contrary: to assess the efficiency of an 
institution, one compares it to feasible alternatives. My own evaluation of the efficiency of 
guilds compared a strongly guilded textile industry in early modern Germany to other 
examples of that same textile branch in other early modern European economies which were 
characterized by a variety of alternative institutional frameworks.36 These ranged from very 
strong guilds (including those in my own study of the Württemberg Black Forest), to much 
weaker guilds in some other central and northern European economies, to entirely unguilded 
frameworks in some Dutch and English worsted regions. Product quality, training and 
technology were regulated in some European worsted industries by guilds, but in others by 
municipal administrations, state regulations, merchant offices, or private contracts between 
individual weavers, apprentices, spinners, merchants, and customers. The evidence presented 
in these case studies demonstrates that those industries that made use of these institutional 
alternatives to guilds produced something closer to the quality-price combinations that 
customers demanded, transmitted more appropriate levels of skill to a wider array of 
practitioners, and more readily generated and adopted innovations, than those that were 
regulated by guilds. This demonstrates that there were feasible alternative institutions in pre-
modern Europe that were more efficient than guilds, and hence that guilds cannot be 
characterized as efficient.37 In a publication of 2004, I point out that none of the alternative 
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institutional frameworks for pre-modern industry were free of market failures, but that they 
demonstrate the existence of alternative institutions that were superior to guilds: 
As shown by the difficult and often painful process of development even in the 
richest, most innovative, and fastest-growing economies of early modern Europe – 
the Low Countries and England – the pre-industrial economy had plenty of market 
failures, and these could be very hard to correct. But the even more painful 
development of economies such as Württemberg suggests that powerful guilds were 
not the answer to correcting them.38  
As will be discussed later in Section 7, precisely such systematic comparison of detailed case-
studies on particular industries across different European economies is essential for 
investigating whether guilds – or any other institutional arrangement – were efficient in the 
sense that there was no feasible alternative institution such that the gains of those who would 
benefit from the alternative exceed the losses of those who were harmed by it. 
 
Most enthusiasts for guilds explicitly describe them as economically ‘efficient’. Even those 
who do not acknowledge subscribing to an ‘efficiency’ theory assert that guilds’ aggregate 
social benefits outweighed their costs – and thus advance the claim of potential Pareto-
efficiency. In making such assertions, these scholars focus specifically on the contribution of 
craft guilds to four aspects of pre-modern economic activity: quality control, skilled training, 
technological innovation, and political ‘coordination’ of the economy. In the following 
sections of this paper, I explore each of these arguments in turn. 
 
2. Did Guilds Improve Quality Control? 
 
A first argument advanced by enthusiasts is that craft guilds were an efficient solution to 
asymmetries of information about product quality, because they imposed minimum quality 
standards and punished masters who violated them. As I have pointed out in a number of 
publications, even in theory there are a number of problems with this view. First, it takes for 
granted that what merchants and consumers wanted, and what was best for the economy, was 
a high absolute quality. But the relevant quality level is what consumers want. The problem of 
‘quality’ under asymmetric information is solved not by guaranteeing a minimum quality 
level, but by providing reliable information about what the quality is. The quality can be low, 
as long as the customer knows what it is. Second, guilds were not ideally suited to provide the 
relevant quality level – i.e. what consumers wanted – because they justified their other 
privileges (e.g. barriers to entry) by claiming that these ensured high quality. This could lead 
to the rigid imposition of inappropriately high quality standards, even when a lower quality in 
combination with a lower price would have better addressed customer demand. Third, while a 
single, monopolistic entity such as a guild might be more capable than a variegated range of 
individual producers to guarantee a single, standard quality, those same characteristics made a 
guild less able, and probably also less willing, to undertake the market research and the 
flexible response to changes in demand necessary to deliver the combinations of quality and 
price desired by a varied and changing population of consumers. This problem was pointed 
out by contemporary critics and surfaces repeatedly in disputes between low-cost competitors 
and the guilds who sought to prohibit them. 
 
These theoretical problems are compounded by the inadequacy of the evidence adduced to 
support the view that guilds benefited the economy through their quality-related activities. 
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This evidence consists primarily of references to low-quality craft work in medieval literature, 
together with the quality regulations included in guild legislation. As I have pointed out, 
literary evidence is a poor guide to what guilds actually did, since works of the imagination 
have an interesting but inconsistent relationship with reality. Legislation, too, is an inadequate 
guide to economic practice, since it serves normative rather than descriptive ends.39 
Furthermore, guild legislation was typically influenced by guild lobbying. Since quality 
controls could be portrayed as generally beneficial, they provided a good rhetorical basis for 
justifying entry barriers, output quotas, and price controls that would otherwise have aroused 
socio-political opposition.40  
 
Even if legislation could be regarded as an accurate guide to economic reality, it does not 
support the view that guilds placed a high priority on quality control. Enthusiasts for guilds 
have claimed that a ‘majority’ of guild statutes were devoted to monitoring quality and that 
guild legislation imposed ‘exceedingly harsh sanctions’ for quality violations. But these can 
be falsified by analyses of actual guild charters and ordinances, many of which dedicated little 
space to quality-related issues and imposed quite lenient penalties on quality offences.41 
 
To assess whether guilds solved information asymmetries between producers and consumers, 
we need to analyze actual guild practice with regard to quality control. In publications of 1997 
and 2004, I carried out such an analysis using exceptionally rich surviving records from a 
strongly guilded worsted textile industry in the German territory of Württemberg between the 
late sixteenth and the late eighteenth century.42 These showed that guilds levied numerous 
trivial fines for quality offences, but that the fines imposed were lower than for any other type 
of offence – too mild a sanction to constitute an effective deterrent, which is why the number 
of offences was so high. Even when guild inspectors did enforce quality regulations, they did 
not always do so to protect customers against poor products, but rather to protect guild 
masters against cheaper competitors threatening to attract away customers. Weavers, guild 
inspectors, merchants and government officials all described guild quality controls as 
inadequate, and merchants soon substituted their own quality inspections carried out at the 
point at which they purchased cloths from weavers. 
 
There were two structural reasons why guild quality controls were inadequate. First, as self-
regulating professional associations guilds suffered from disincentives to offend or penalize 
their members. Second, guild inspectors lacked the incentive to develop the skills and deploy 
the effort necessary to detect low-quality work beyond superficial features (such as size) 
which were readily apparent to merchants and other customers anyway. In some industries, in 
fact, guild regulations indirectly harmed quality, by imposing price ceilings on raw materials 
(so suppliers could only compete by lowering quality), imposing piece-rate ceilings on sub-
contractors such as spinners (depriving them of incentives to work more carefully), and 
enforcing collective ‘monopoly contracting’ between producers and merchants with fixed 
prices and quotas (creating a rigid regime of prices and quotas that removed craftsmen’s 
incentives to do better work and merchants’ incentives to experiment with new quality-price 
ratios that might better suit consumer demand).  
 
A comparison of outcomes in the same craft across different European economies vividly 
illustrates the weakness of the view that guilds were efficient institutions for ensuring product 
quality. My survey of the European worsted industry – one of the largest branches of the pre-
modern textile sector – showed that product quality in strongly guilded industries compared 
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poorly with that in many of the more dynamic and successful industries where guilds were 
weak or absent.43 In many successful European worsted industries, insofar as information 
asymmetries between producers and consumers were important, they were solved through 
alternative institutions – municipal, merchant, or state inspections – that dealt with the 
problem efficiently without the rigidities imposed by guilds. The West Riding of Yorkshire, 
for instance, developed the most successful worsted industry in eighteenth-century Europe by 
producing ‘cheap and nasty’ cloths subject to no quality (but also no price) controls by guilds; 
quality was monitored by merchants and customers at point of sale. 
 
Enthusiasts for guilds have sought to cast doubt on these arguments in four ways, which are 
exemplified in the essay by Epstein mentioned above.44 A first approach is to claim that the 
relevant quality standard – the one that was best for the economy as a whole – was not that 
which consumers desired, but rather the minimum quality standards desired by guilds. A 
second is to reassert the importance of legislative evidence, claiming that the fact that most 
guild laws mentioned quality indicated that it was a major guild concern. Third, enthusiasts 
for guilds argue that high numbers of quality offences by guilded craftsmen testify not to 
guilds’ ineffectiveness in improving quality but to guilds’ success. A final approach, adopted 
by Epstein, is to dispute the evidence presented in my German case study, seeking to 
reinterpret it such a way as to establish that guilds were economically beneficial. Let us 
examine each of these arguments in turn. 
 
2.1. What Does Economic Theory Tell Us about Guild Quality Controls? 
 
The first line of approach by enthusiasts for guilds is to dispute what precisely was required to 
solve asymmetries of information between producers and consumers. Previously, enthusiasts 
had argued that guilds solved this problem by setting minimum quality standards, thereby 
ensuring high average quality. Thus, for instance, Gustafsson’s thesis was ‘that the craft 
guilds were founded primarily for guaranteeing a certain minimum of quality of the products 
produced by the craftsmen’ and that guilds’ primary concern was to ensure ‘a sufficiently 
high quality of product’.45 According to Richardson, ‘For guilds of manufacturers, a typical 
commitment was making high-quality merchandise’.46 Pfister argued that guilds were 
especially important in proto-industries because dispersed rural producers tended to let quality 
fall unless a centralized guild constrained them to produce to a higher standard: ‘By 
controlling quality ... the guild acted as an institution for delegated monitoring. ... The guild 
would also assure a supply of goods of constant high quality and thus greatly reduced 
transactions costs of merchants.’47 
 
In earlier publications, I pointed out that the key to encouraging consumers to make 
purchases, thereby increasing gains from trade, was not to enforce a single, high average 
quality but rather to reduce the variance (that is, ensure that consumers knew what quality to 
expect of an item, even if that quality was low) and to ensure that producers offered the 
quality-price combinations desired by a varied and changing population of consumers (poorer 
consumers would be satisfied with lower quality if that implied lower price).48  
 
In response to these points, the recent paper by Epstein has sought to change the theoretical 
basis for the argument that guilds solved asymmetries of information about product quality. 
His approach is to argue that the guilds’ approach of fixing minimum standards was identical 
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to reducing variance, and that this was what was needed to ensure the quality that was best for 
the economy at large.49 
 
This argument ignores the fact that the appropriate quality-price combinations are those that 
consumers want. This is reflected in the modern literature on quality control in which, 
according to a recent survey, ‘the most pervasive definition of quality currently in use is the 
extent to which a product or service meets and/or exceeds a customer’s expectations.’50 High 
quality per se – the level achieved by setting a minimum standard – is not obviously 
desirable.  
 
By imposing minimum standards, guilds cut off the lower part of the quality distribution. This 
was a bad way to address consumers’ wants, since it ruled out a whole array of quality-price 
combinations which poor consumers in particular were likely to demand. Nor was it 
obviously a good way of reducing variance or information asymmetries. Guild inspections not 
only denied lower-quality items the guild seal, but often prohibited them from being sold at 
all, by confiscating them, defacing them, or prosecuting their sellers. If the aim of guild 
quality controls had been to reduce information asymmetries, the guild would have permitted 
consumers to choose between guild-sealed items (higher in quality but also higher in price) 
and non-guild-sealed items (lower in quality but also lower in price). The fact that guild 
quality controls prohibited non-guild-sealed items altogether suggests that the guild’s aim 
was not so much to reduced information asymmetries as to ensure that only recognized guild 
members could legally supply products to customers and to enforce arbitrarily high standards 
with the aim of excluding lower-priced competitors. The quality-regulation procedures 
typically selected by guilds were thus well suited to excluding entry but poorly suited to 
addressing consumer wants. 
  
Such reduction in variance as was achieved by guild regulations which cut off the lower part 
of the quality distribution came at a high cost in terms of lost gains from trade, since these 
prevented all trade in low-priced, low-quality items which addressed the demand of the mass 
of poorer consumers who could not afford the expensive, high-quality products mandated by 
monopolistic guild producers. As the French aristocrat Alexis de Toqueville described – not 
wholly approvingly – in 1840, ‘When none but the wealthy had watches, they were almost all 
very good ones: few are now made which are worth much, but everybody has one in his 
pocket.’51  
 
It is not even clear that guilds’ net effect on variance was to reduce it. On the one hand, guild 
regulations reduced variance by prohibiting low-quality, low-priced goods. But on the other, 
they pushed nasty-but-cheap wares into the black market, where quality variance was even 
higher and where cheated customers had no legal redress. The net effect of guild controls on 
quality variance was thus indeterminate, while the prohibition of lower price-quality 
combinations damaged consumers – especially the poor. The attempt to conflate guilds’ 
enforcement of ‘minimum standards’ with the desirable aims of reducing variance, improving 
consumer confidence, and encouraging exchange is logically misguided.  
 
Even within the restricted quality range permitted by guilds, my German case study suggested 
that guild inspectors applied quality requirements that were inappropriately high and then 
operated corruptly by letting some quality offences pass unpunished.52 Epstein asserts that this 
is impossible: guild quality standards cannot have been both inappropriately high and 
corruptly enforced. But this conflates two issues – the regulations guilds imposed and their 
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enforcement in practice. Evidence from guilded industries throughout pre-modern Europe 
shows that guild inspectors were subject to personal pressure and often enforced quality 
regulations inconsistently; this rendered them ineffectual in maintaining any mandated quality 
standards. At the same time, the standards that they were supposed to enforce (and did 
enforce when they were not operating corruptly) were often inappropriately high, prohibiting 
the legal production and exchange of lower quality-price combinations that better suited 
consumer demand; this rendered guilds ineffectual in ensuring appropriate quality (the quality 
that consumers wanted) and thus in encouraging exchange. Inappropriately high guild quality 
standards could even encourage corrupt enforcement, since such regulations created pent-up 
demand for the low quality-price combinations banned by the guild, and hence incentives for 
producers and consumers to bribe and pressure inspectors. This in turn imposed deadweight 
losses by diverting resources into redistributive activities (attempts to put pressure on the 
inspectors) rather than productive uses. Recent studies find precisely this mutually reinforcing 
combination of inappropriate regulation with corrupt enforcement in modern less-developed 
economies, although the institutions that give rise to it are seldom characterized as beneficial 
or efficient.53 
 
2.2. Can Legislation Show That Guilds Benefited Quality? 
 
Enthusiasts also seek to buttress the quality case for guild efficiency by reasserting the 
usefulness of legislative evidence. Rehabilitation studies about guilds’ quality benefits 
continue to proliferate, basing their assertions wholly on legislation, yet providing no data on 
how, if at all, such legislation was put into practice.54 These studies are then cited to 
demonstrate a ‘modern consensus’ that guilds were efficient institutions to ensure quality.55 In 
his recent paper, for instance, Epstein claims that ‘there is substantial evidence that ... urban 
guilds, particularly those specializing in high quality goods, could protect their brand names 
successfully’. This ‘substantial evidence’ turns out to be a single article based entirely on 
legislative sources..56 
 
In previous publications, I have pointed out three fundamental problems with using legislation 
as evidence of guild concern for quality control. First, legislation says nothing about what 
actually happened: without evidence on enforcement, it is meaningless. Second, legislation 
reflects rhetorical aims as well as real concern: beneficial ends such as quality control can be 
used to justify harmful means such as exclusive privileges. And third, a law may mention an 
issue without prioritizing it.57  
 
The literature that uses legislation to buttress the claim that guilds performed a beneficial 
quality function has found no way of dealing with the first two problems, and continues to 
ignore them. The third problem was already recognized by Gustafsson in 1987, who 
addressed it by claiming that ‘the majority of the guild statues [sic] are concerned precisely 
with demands for a sufficiently high quality of product’.58 My German case study investigated 
this claim for a series of Württemberg worsted-weavers’ guild ordinances and found that only 
a minority of articles in any ordinance – ranging from a low of 12 per cent to a high of 35 per 
cent – bore even the remotest application to quality control.59 This investigation has yet to be 
replicated by scholars studying other guilds and industries. However, Mocarelli’s assessment 
of the statutes of the guilds established in Milan in the second half of the sixteenth century 
found that, unlike the statutes of their medieval predecessors, they were ‘extremely vague’ 
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about quality.60 Such findings place the onus of proof on enthusiasts for guilds to demonstrate 
that even guild legislation, let alone guild practice, made quality a priority. 
 
Epstein’s essay does not provide such evidence, instead claiming that what Gustafsson meant, 
and what really matters, is whether an entire guild statute contains any mention of quality, not 
how much space it devotes to quality.61 This is certainly a good way of making guilds’ 
concern with quality appear to its best advantage. But is it a good way of assessing such 
concern? If quality control was of central importance to guilds then one would expect a 
majority of articles in any guild law to be concerned with that issue. But if guild ordinances 
simply allude to quality control in passing, as a justification for imposing other restrictions 
that might otherwise evoke opposition, then one would expect to find most guild laws 
mentioning quality control but allocating few articles to it. The empirical findings support the 
latter view.62  
 
All three problems with legislative evidence therefore remain outstanding. Legislation cannot 
be used to analyse what guilds actually did. Even in order to use it as evidence of guild 
concerns, its rhetorical function in justifying guild privileges, and its priority compared to 
other concerns, must be analysed carefully. Insofar as such investigations have been carried 
out, they suggest that quality was not of overriding concern even to those who drafted 
legislation, let alone to those who enforced the resulting regulations. 
 
2.3. What Do Numerous Quality Violations Show? 
 
Claims that guilds created quality benefits have hitherto relied mainly on legislative evidence, 
so studies of guilds’ practical enforcement are few. Those that exist rely mainly on qualitative 
examples rather than quantitative analyses. One of the few available quantitative analyses is 
provided in my study of the annual account-books of the largest worsted-weavers’ guild in the 
Württemberg Black Forest between the late sixteenth and the late eighteenth century.63 In his 
recent paper Epstein claims that I ignore the high numbers of quality offences which, he 
contends, demonstrate that guilds were ‘seriously concerned with quality control’.64 Both 
assertions are false. My case study explicitly draws attention to the numerous quality offences 
fined by the guild.65 These high numbers, as I demonstrate, arose from the trivial level of fine 
inflicted for quality violations, which was significantly lower than for non-quality-related 
offences.66 The combination of lenient penalties and numerous violations provide greater 
support for an interpretation precisely contrary to that advanced by Epstein – guilds were 
unconcerned to maintain quality standards (otherwise they would have imposed heavier 
penalties) and ineffectual in doing so (otherwise they would not have tolerated such high 
numbers of offences over such long periods of time). 
 
Similar findings emerge from other guild studies. Thus, for instance, London livery 
companies also imposed very lenient penalties – apologies, minor fines, promises of 
reformation – ‘even in quite serious matters such as assaults [on guild quality inspectors] or 
the deliberate falsification of goods’.67 Some companies imposed slightly heavier penalties, 
but the number of offences remained high. Thus Wallis found that 30 per cent of the 
membership of the London Apothecaries and Stationers’ Companies in the early seventeenth 
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century were guilty of breaking ordinances. As Goose points out, this raises two important 
questions:  
If at least the short-term, moderated costs of offending could be quite substantial, why 
were offences so common? And if the principle of regulation was so clearly accepted, 
then why were even senior members of these companies able to transgress without 
serious damage to their long-term reputation?68 
Davis found that members of the London Merchant Taylors’ Company also committed a large 
number of quality offences in the seventeenth century and, as Goose comments, 
In the realm of quality control ... the company played a much more limited role, 
which perhaps testifies to the sophistication of the market and the effectiveness of 
consumer choice by this period. We are, of course, still left unclear as to how 
effective the company’s measures were, for if repeated levying of fines gives a firm 
indication of intent, it could also reflect a continuing failure to remedy the problem 
once and for all.69 
As criminologists and historians of crime have long recognized, when a particular offence is 
committed frequently and persistently, it raises serious doubt about the authorities’ concern to 
control that offence and their effectiveness in doing so. 
 
Guilds’ actual practice in penalizing quality violations needs more thorough analysis. But the 
pattern revealed by both the Württemberg worsted-weavers’ guild and these London livery 
companies suggests not so much that guilds were concerned and successful in deterring 
quality offences, but rather that they regarded quality delicts indulgently and tolerated high 
levels of violation over very long periods. This was consistent with the political realities of 
early modern rent-seeking, which meant that guilds needed to be seen to be penalizing quality 
offences as a visible justification of their other privileges. It is not consistent with modern 
enthusiasts’ desire to view guilds as efficient institutions for actually guaranteeing quality 
outcomes.  
 
The few available studies of guild enforcement, therefore, do not show guilds imposing 
sanctions remotely substantial enough to prevent their own members from frequently and 
persistently violating quality standards. This casts further doubt on the putative economic 
benefits conferred by guild quality regulations. 
 
2.4. Can the Evidence Be Reinterpreted to Rehabilitate Guilds’ Role in Quality Control? 
 
The literature arguing that guilds generated quality benefits typically does not support its 
claims with evidence on actual guild practice, as discussed above. This does not prevent the 
recent article by Epstein from claiming that my more sceptical view of guilds’ quality role is 
based on inadequate evidence – on ‘a few’ merchant complaints, on low-quality industries 
with dispersed producers, or on a misinterpretation of my own case study. But this cavalier 
dismissal of the empirical findings is without foundation. 
 
Epstein’s first claim is that evidence of guild ineffectiveness consists only of ‘a few merchant 
complaints about the Württemberg and Gera worsted industries’.70 This is false. My study 
provides examples of failed guild inspections from four European worsted industries – those 
of the Black Forest of Württemberg, the Gera region of Thuringia, the English city of York, 
and Valenciennes in French Flanders.71 It also provides examples of eight other European 
worsted industries which successfully ensured appropriate quality standards with an 
unguilded or weakly guilded institutional structure – those of Douai, Hondschoote, Verviers, 
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Maubeuge, Igualada, Stockholm, Norwich, and the rural West Riding of Yorkshire.72 Twelve 
European case studies is a far cry from ‘a few merchant complaints’. 
 
A second claim is that guilds were only ineffective in controlling quality in low-quality rural 
industries where producers were spatially scattered. Thus Epstein asserts that Württemberg 
worsted guilds failed to control quality because they operated in a rural proto-industry with 
dispersed producers.73 This claim is echoed by Mocarelli, who proclaims that Württemberg 
guilds ‘were special, not only on account of their rural character, but above all because they 
did not produce high quality goods’.74 In fact, as my publications make clear, the 
Württemberg worsted industry was practised in both urban and rural locations.75 It was highly 
concentrated, with between 26 and 43 per cent of the households in proto-industrial 
communities headed by worsted-weavers, and guild officers residing locally in both towns 
and villages.76 Guild ineffectiveness in quality control also emerges from high-quality urban 
crafts. Thus, for instance, the twelve European case studies mentioned above include both 
urban and rural industries, high- and low-quality worsteds, yet demonstrate no correlation 
between quality and guilds.77 Many highly concentrated urban crafts maintained quality 
through alternative, non-guild institutional arrangements set up by merchants, municipalities, 
or the state.78 Early modern London craftsmen, with livery company regulations at their 
disposal, instead chose to protect brand names using the common law courts.79 Conversely, 
London craft guilds in ‘high-quality’ sectors enforced quality regulations as corruptly as 
Württemberg proto-industrial guilds in ‘low-quality’ sectors, as shown by Homer’s study of 
the London pewterers’ company which levied quality fines on products from provincial 
workshops ‘on the flimsiest pretext’, not because ‘the London company was driven by 
altruism to protect the populace at large from dubious goods’ but because of ‘the profit 
received from fines and from the sale of seized metal’, which it split with the Crown in return 
for enforcement of its guild charter.80 In recognition of the fact that high-quality crafts 
developed non-guild institutional mechanisms to control quality, other scholars have 
advanced precisely the opposite argument to Epstein and Mocarelli. Thus Pfister argues that 
guilds were necessary for quality control precisely in rural proto-industries because the 
dispersed nature of the producers made it more difficult for merchants to monitor quality 
directly.81 The contradictory claims of different scholars concerning guilds’ impact on quality 
illustrate how totally conjectural they are. When one subjects these conjectures to empirical 
inquiry, one finds that guilds were neither necessary nor sufficient for quality control, whether 
the industry was urban or rural, craft or proto-industry, concentrated or dispersed, high-
quality or low-quality.  
 
In the absence of convincing evidence to support a positive assessment of guilds’ quality role, 
Epstein seeks to discredit my more critical assessment through an inaccurate attack on my 
German case study. He begins by claiming that the quality of Württemberg worsteds was not 
actually low and was improved over time by guilds, asserting that there is ‘evidence that 
demand for Wildberg worsted shifted to lower quality cloth in the aftermath of the Thirty 
Years War, but improved again from the early eighteenth century’.82 He provides no footnote 
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to substantiate this startling assertion, which has no basis in fact and is falsified by the major 
nineteenth-century study of this industry by Troeltsch,83 as well as by my own publications of 
1997 and 200484 – all included in Epstein’s bibliography. Epstein’s assertion is sheer 
invention. 
 
More inaccurately still, Epstein seeks to reinterpret the Württemberg evidence in the light of 
his own enthusiasm for guilds. As an illustration of the pattern whereby guilds prohibited 
nasty-but-cheap goods that consumers desired to buy, I instanced the case of Jacob Zeyher. 
Zeyher was a weaver in the Württemberg town of Wildberg who complained in 1661 that his 
guild refused to seal the cloths he made, thereby preventing him from selling them, even 
though he had customers in a town in the neighbouring German territory of Baden who 
demanded that specific type of cloth from him.85 Epstein claims that ‘the Wildberg guild 
objected to the man’s attempt to apply the guild’s trade mark illegitimately, and not to his 
shoddy goods per se’.86 This is simply false. The guild described the situation as follows, in 
the words quoted in my article: ‘Old Jacob Zeyher makes absolutely terrible cloths, which are 
not worth sealing, but sells his cloths very cheap, and thereby causes the craft great injury’.87 
This is all the guild said about the goods in question: they described Zeyher’s cloths as 
‘absolutely terrible’ and ‘very cheap’, but made no mention whatsoever of any attempt ‘to 
apply the guild’s trade mark illegitimately’. In fact, Zeyher was willing either to comply with 
the guild trade-marking practices by obtaining the appropriate seal from the inspectors or to 
sell his cloths without seals, but found that the guild would permit him neither option. As his 
defence made clear, Zeyher was not trying to act illegitimately, but rather to comply with 
guild regulations while supplying the type of cloth his customers demanded: ‘he has to make 
the cloth 2 ells wide, he sells such cloth in Offenburg, the people want it like that from him, 
and otherwise he can’t sell it, but the sealers will not seal it for him’.88 It is impossible to 
judge whether Zeyher’s cloths were truly ‘terrible’ (since the guild sealers had an incentive to 
claim they were shoddy, irrespective of their actual quality) or simply the non-standard 2-ell 
width (since Zeyher had an incentive to minimize his deviation from guild standards). What 
emerges from the testimony of both Zeyher and the guild officers was that these cloths were 
attractive to customers and profitable to Zeyher. Both the customers and Zeyher were 
therefore harmed by the guild’s prohibition on the exchange they would otherwise voluntarily 
have undertaken. There is no evidence that Zeyher was trying to apply the guild’s trade mark 
illegitimately, nor for Epstein’s further farfetched argument, that this case reveals the guild 
‘creating a market for lower quality ... by overcoming potential moral hazard and information 
asymmetries’.89 The example of Jacob Zeyher provides no support whatsoever for Epstein’s 
rosy vision of what guilds might have done.  
 
Neither economic theory nor empirical findings thus support recent efforts to breathe new life 
into the case for guilds’ beneficial quality role. Claims that there is now a ‘modern consensus’ 
about the quality benefits of guilds are weakened by the scepticism evinced even by some 
enthusiasts for guilds concerning such arguments, who have themselves pointed out that 
quality control was often exercised more efficiently by other institutional arrangements and 
that many successful pre-modern crafts did not have guild quality controls.90 Furthermore, the 
arguments advanced for the necessity of guild quality controls are contradictory, with some 
enthusiasts claiming that guilds’ quality role was reserved to high-quality crafts while others 
argue that it was particularly important in low-quality proto-industries. The conjectural 
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assertion that guild controls were the best way to ensure appropriate quality and encourage 
exchange breaks down under logical analysis. The relevant quality level is what consumers 
want, whereas guilds enforced the quality level desired by a cartel of producers. Attempts to 
reinstate legislative evidence as a basis for demonstrating guild quality concerns fail to 
address the usual problems with using normative sources as a guide to actual practice. Claims 
that numerous quality violations show serious guild concern for quality control are 
undermined by evidence that they arose mainly because guilds lacked the motivation or the 
capacity to deter offenders effectively. Finally, efforts to reinterpret my German case study so 
as to cast a rosier light on guild quality controls are completely lacking in foundation. 
 
3. Were Guilds Important for Human Capital Investment? 
 
A second theory advanced by enthusiasts claims that guilds solved imperfections in markets 
for human capital investment, through their apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership 
requirements. As I have pointed out, this view is based on three assumptions for which there 
is no evidence: first, that pre-modern crafts all required high levels of skill, justifying many 
years of apprenticeship and journeymanship; second, that the skills needed for pre-modern 
craft production could only be transmitted through formal apprenticeship; and third, that 
guilds were the only possible providers of apprenticeships.91 
 
No evidence is cited for any of these assumptions. The favourable assessment of guilds’ 
economic role again derives almost exclusively from legislative sources. Not only does 
legislation show nothing about actual practice, but guilds had strong incentives to emphasize 
skilled training in their charters in order to justify entry barriers.  
 
Evidence on actual practice, which I have presented in a series of publications, casts doubt on 
the view that guilds were necessary or sufficient to provide appropriate levels of training.92 
Black-market ‘encroachers’ who failed to secure guild training – often, as in the case of 
women, Jews, immigrants, and bastards, because guilds excluded them from apprenticeship 
and journeymanship – were bitterly opposed by guilds precisely because the wares they 
produced were indistinguishable from guild output and were willingly purchased by 
merchants and consumers. Non-trivial numbers of masters’ wives and widows were permitted 
by guilds to work in guilded sectors without guild training even after very short marriages, 
producing wares which passed guild and merchant inspections and sold successfully on export 
markets. At the same time, vast numbers of similarly untrained women – and men – who 
lacked legal guild licenses were forbidden to do the same work, illustrating the irrelevance of 
training to most guilded crafts and the indifference of guilds to skill as a criterion for selecting 
who could practise. Guilds made apprenticeship and journeymanship compulsory, but then 
often failed to guarantee skills: they did not penalize masters who neglected apprentices, they 
issued certificates to apprentices without examination, and they conferred mastership licenses 
on journeymen without seriously testing skills. This resulted from the incentives which guilds 
had, as associations of masters, to certify members’ sons without discrimination, and to 
permit opportunism by masters who did not wish to incur the costs of training their 
apprentices or journeymen. Evidence on how guilds actually operated suggests that they 
imposed apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership requirements not to ensure skilled 
training but rather as a means rhetorically to justify and practically to monitor the entry 
barriers that sustained their monopoly rents.  
 
These findings are borne out by comparisons across different European industries and 
economies. Many pre-industrial crafts were not highly skilled, hence did not require 
prolonged formal training, and yet were guilded in some European societies and unguilded in 
others. Textiles made up by far the largest pre-modern industrial sector, yet a comparison of 
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textile industries across Europe shows that most textile wares – particularly in the rapidly-
growing worsted, light woollen, linen and cotton sectors – could be successfully produced and 
sold on export markets for centuries by producers who did not have formal guild training.93 
Not just in textiles, but in metal and wooden wares as well, guilds appear to have been 
irrelevant to skills transmission, since the same industry was guilded in some parts of Europe 
and unguilded in others – examples are scythe making, iron goods making, wooden toy 
making, and straw hat plaiting.94 In England, nearly every craft one observes regulated by 
guilds in the older incorporated towns had an unguilded equivalent in a new town, an old 
town that had abolished its guilds, or a rural industrial region.95 What decided whether an 
activity was guilded was thus not its skill requirements but rather whether a group of 
practitioners was politically able to secure and maintain guild privileges over that activity. 
 
Faced with such evidence, enthusiasts for guilds have sought to reassert their views through 
five lines of argument. First, the recent article by Epstein seeks to short up the ‘human capital’ 
view of guilds by appealing to cognitive psychology. Second, enthusiasts reassert the 
importance of legislative evidence, claiming that the fact that all guild laws mentioned skilled 
training indicated that these were a major guild concern, and that there was no possible 
alternative reason for guilds to have included training regulations in their legislation except 
for a sincere desire to protect consumers by guaranteeing skills. Third, scholars who wish to 
rehabilitate guilds seek to dismiss as economically irrelevant the fact that guilds excluded 
females from learning industrial skills through apprenticeship or journeymanship and 
prohibited them from deploying such skills as fully-fledged masters. Fourth, scholars who 
favour guilds’ positive economic role dispute the evidence that guild apprenticeship itself did 
not function effectively as a training mechanism in many cases but did function effectively as 
a barrier to entry. Fifth, the recent article by Epstein claims that evidence on guilds’ 
ineffectiveness in providing skilled craft training derives solely from the industry analysed in 
my own case study, namely worsted textile production. Finally, enthusiasts for guilds dispute 
the evidence from European comparisons casting doubt on guilds’ importance in training. Let 
us examine each of these arguments in turn. 
 
3.1. Does Cognitive Psychology Show That Guilds Were Essential? 
 
The human capital case for guilds, as I have pointed out, rests on shaky foundations, since it 
fails to address whether all pre-modern crafts required long training, whether craft training 
required formal apprenticeship, and whether apprenticeship could only be supplied through 
guilds. In a recent attempt to shore up these foundations, Epstein has appealed to the authority 
of cognitive psychology. Epstein claims that to question the training role of guilds is to 
‘ignore the cognitive foundations of human learning’.96 To remedy this omission, he provides 
a disquisition on knowledge transmission derived from psychology textbooks. This exposition 
may accurately summarize the content of the textbooks from which it is drawn, but is not 
germane to the economic role of guilds. Upon inspection, ‘the cognitive foundations of 
human learning’ boil down to just two propositions: first, learning to do something usually 
requires some sort of training, which can be either formal or informal; second, becoming a 
‘top-level’ expert can take quite a long time (5,000-10,000 hours), but ‘most professionals 
reach a stable, average level of performance within a relatively short time frame’.97  
 
These truisms, a slim yield for any purpose, are wholly irrelevant to the issue at hand. Few 
would dispute that skill requires training and training requires time. But this tells us nothing 
about the questions that matter for assessing economic institutions. How much training was 
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needed to practise a pre-modern craft? What type of training did pre-modern crafts require – 
in particular, did they all need formal apprenticeship? What institutions were needed to 
administer pre-modern craft apprenticeships? These questions must be addressed in order to 
judge the conclusion that craft training was ‘best done by guilds’.98 Cognitive psychology 
provides no answers to these questions, even in theory.  
 
Answers to these questions are, by contrast, provided in my own publications, through 
focussing on the acquisition of skills in a particular branch of pre-modern industry – the 
production of worsted and woollen textiles.99 On the basis of micro-level findings for the 
Württemberg industry and macro-level comparisons among different European worsted 
regions, my study established that worsted production did not require the length of training 
imposed by guild apprenticeship regulations.100 Epstein seeks to dispute this finding by 
claiming that worsted production was actually highly skilled, supporting this assertion by 
referring to a historian of early modern Pennsylvania concerning the long list of skills ‘a 
weaver’ had to have.101 But this is irrelevant to the question of how long it took to learn these 
skills, let alone whether they required a guild apprenticeship – which they cannot have done 
in Epstein’s Pennsylvania example, since American crafts were not organized in guilds.102 
Even in Europe, as shown by the evidence presented in my study, many contemporaries did 
not believe that it took a long time to learn worsted-weaving skills or that guild apprenticeship 
was required to do so.103 That there were skills is irrelevant – what matters is how difficult 
they were to learn. Furthermore, as I show, European worsted industries in which 
practitioners did not train for lengthy periods and did not undergo guild apprenticeships 
achieved levels of skill that enabled them to satisfy customers and expand successfully.104 
 
My study also showed that production in the worsted sector did not require the type of 
training involved in formal apprenticeship.105 Female workers, for instance, were denied 
access to guild apprenticeship and journeymanship, but were nonetheless so skilful that they 
were viewed as serious threats by guilded masters, who used their guild organizations to 
harass and exclude them.106 Epstein retorts that non-guild-trained female labour does not 
show guild training to have been unnecessary since ‘their training may have been informal, 
but it existed none the less’.107 This is precisely the point. Practising this industry – and those 
many others in which unapprenticed persons worked, whether legally or illegally – required a 
type of training which could be, and was, obtained without formal apprenticeship. Indeed, as 
Epstein himself acknowledges, my data for the Württemberg worsted industry show that 20 
per cent of practising widows were in a position to practise the craft successfully despite 
having been married to a master for less than the 6 years of combined apprenticeship and 
journeymanship required by the guild.108 Many unmarried women, widows of non-masters, 
and male outsiders sought to practise the industry illegally, without ever having been in the 
household of a master weaver, and hence without having had the opportunity to obtain formal 
or informal training from a guild master. This could be because the industry in question did 
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not require much training (as suggested by much evidence for mass-market textile crafts such 
as worsted production) or because the industry did require skilled training but formal 
apprenticeship was unnecessary for providing it (as suggested by the prevalence of black-
market female workers in numerous crafts all over pre-industrial Europe). In either case, the 
existence of females (and Jews, and immigrants, and other ‘encroachers’) who were 
sufficiently skilled to constitute a threat to formally guild-trained producers demonstrates that 
formal guild apprenticeships (and the guilds that demanded them) were irrelevant to providing 
whatever training was required. 
 
Finally, the evidence presented in my publications established that guilds did not provide 
would-be craft practitioners with the appropriate level of learning. Almost all guilds excluded 
females from apprenticeship and journeymanship, thereby denying half the population access 
to formal training in the industrial sector. Guilds also excluded many males from 
apprenticeship according to parentage, religion, ethnicity, nationality, legitimate birth, and 
other economically irrelevant characteristics. Nonetheless, non-guild-trained females and 
males demonstrated both the desire and the capability to participate in industrial activities 
wherever guilds did not prevent them from doing so.109 Industries in which there were no 
guilds or where guild apprenticeship regulations were widely flouted achieved levels of 
quality and technical innovation that enabled them to satisfy customers and expand 
successfully. Where formal apprenticeships were needed, young people entered into them 
voluntarily and privately as in painters’ workshops, without any need for guild compulsion. 
Alternative institutional frameworks were evidently capable of providing training at least as 
efficiently as guilds, without excluding a large majority of would-be practitioners.110 
 
It seems likely, as I have pointed out in previous publications, that skills requirements differed 
across pre-modern industrial activities.111 But it is indubitably the case that some large sectors 
– such as wool textiles – demanded a length, type, and institutional framework for training 
that did not require guilds. The question of the appropriate length and type of training is still 
unanswered for most pre-modern industries, both inside and outside the textile sector. But 
enthusiasts for guilds have cited no evidence against the proposition that for many industries 
in pre-modern Europe the required training was shorter and less formal than that required by 
guilds. Nor have they provided an alternative explanation for the fact that many successful 
and expanding industries flourished in pre-modern Europe without their practitioners’ 
engaging in lengthy formal training. These issues cannot be addressed or resolved by 
appealing to psychology textbooks. 
 
3.2. Can Legislation Show That Training Required Guilds? 
 
The second line of approach of enthusiasts for guilds is to reassert the usability of legislative 
evidence, claiming that the fact that all guild laws mentioned skilled training indicated that 
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these were a major guild concern. For the reasons already discussed earlier, legislation is an 
unreliable guide to actual practice. Even as a guide to guild priorities, legislation must be read 
critically. Guilds had two other incentives – apart from concern for the common weal – to 
include training regulations in their legislation. One was that training requirements made it 
easier for established producers to monitor and restrict entry to the industry, thereby 
protecting themselves from competition and defending their monopoly profits. The other 
incentive to include training regulations in guild ordinances was rhetorical: skill was 
unquestionably a good thing, and hence could be used to justify guild restrictions that might 
otherwise have attracted opposition from governments, merchants, or ordinary citizens.  
 
Rehabilitation theorists altogether fail to address the argument that the presence of training 
regulations in all guild ordinances can be explained by their utility in enforcing entry barriers. 
They do address the argument that training provisions could be included in guild ordinances 
for rhetorical reasons, but solely by denying that guilds had any need to justify their 
regulations toward the wider world. Thus Epstein claims that there is no need to analyse the 
rhetorical reasons behind including particular provisions in guild legislation because, he 
asserts, ‘statutory provisions were addressed to the guild membership and not to the outside 
world’.112  
 
This betrays ignorance of the legal basis for the existence of guilds and the regulations 
governing their operations. Guilds obtained charters from municipal and state authorities 
precisely so as to give themselves a legal basis for penalizing or prosecuting members who 
violated regulations and outsiders who infringed on their ‘privileges’. The wording of guild 
charters was often strongly influenced by guild members themselves since, as demonstrated in 
archival research carried out by those who have studied guilds in practice, guild legislation 
typically came into being as a result of petitions and draft ordinances submitted by guild 
delegations.113 The imposition by guilds of penalties and prosecutions on members and 
outsiders, and their denial of permission to learn or practise the economic activities they 
defined as their own exclusive ‘privilege’, inevitably aroused resentment and resistance. 
Consequently, guilds needed to provide justifications in order to persuade legislators, town 
officials, bureaucrats, magistrates, juries, and public opinion that guild regulations benefited 
the common weal and should be promulgated, enforced, and renewed. Guild charters, 
ordinances, and statutes were, therefore, unquestionably addressed to the outside world. Had 
they been addressed solely to the guild membership they would hardly have needed to exist. 
 
The fact that all guild laws mentioned skilled training is thus irrelevant to establishing 
whether guilds were in practice essential for human capital provision. Legislation does not say 
anything about what actually happened. Furthermore, since guilds had other strong incentives 
to include training regulations in their ordinances, legislation cannot even be used to support 
the view that guilds regarded human capital investment as a priority.  
 
3.3. Can Guilds’ Exclusion of Females Be Dismissed? 
 
As already mentioned, one widespread finding that casts doubt on the necessity of guild 
training is the evidence that many pre-modern industries could be successfully practised by 
females, who were legally excluded from guild training. In almost all guilded industries, 
women were officially prohibited from undertaking apprenticeship and journeymanship. 
However, masters’ wives and widows were often (though not always) permitted to practice 
the craft no matter how short a time they had been married. At the same time, similarly 
unapprenticed women who had not married masters were regarded as a dangerous threat to 
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guild members.114 This, as has been widely pointed out in the literature on the history of 
women’s work, is a strong indication that guild training requirements functioned as a barrier 
to entry rather than as an essential instrument for skills transmission.115 
 
Still concerned to defend guilds as economically beneficial despite their having prevented half 
the population from obtaining industrial skills, enthusiasts for guilds adopt the somewhat 
contradictory stance that on the one hand guilds did not restrict women’s work (since that 
would imply that guilds were inefficient and inequitable) but on the other hand women were 
naturally unsuited for skilled craft work because of their domestic responsibilities (so actually 
their exclusion by guilds was justified).  
 
Enthusiasts for guilds have responded to the embarrassing fact that guilds excluded women 
from training by seeking to discount the economic significance of this exclusion. Thus, for 
instance, Crowston has argued that guild restrictions on women did not matter because in 
eighteenth-century France females worked illegally in the black market and obtained 
vocational training through alternative institutions such as all-female guilds, charitable 
schools, female religious communities, or unguilded state manufactures. According to 
Crowston, this shows that ‘there is no essential contradiction between women and guilds’.116 
This misses the point. The fact that some women succeeded in getting around guild 
restrictions through resorting to other institutions or to the black market does not mean that 
guilds had no effect. Alternative training institutions were scarce and costly. As Crowston 
herself admits, even in France all-female guilds were few in number and could only admit 
limited numbers of girls as apprentices; other alternatives only arose through state or church 
intervention, undertaken precisely to compensate for guild barriers to female training.117 As 
for the black market, certainly it offered excluded groups such as women opportunities better 
than those they were offered by formal institutions such as guilds. But, as research on modern 
developing economies shows, the opportunities offered by the informal sector are still poorer 
than those which excluded individuals would have enjoyed had they been allowed to train and 
work in the formal sector. In the informal sector, risks are high, information is poor, violence 
and theft are common, time-horizons are short, workers are unprotected, and investments in 
physical and human capital are limited. Any institution that forces workers into the informal 
sector not only harms those workers but imposes inefficiencies on the whole economy.118 
Institutions that encourage the informal sector may also block change. As Partha Dasgupta 
has trenchantly observed, informal institutions may bring benefits in less developed 
economies, but one should not be ‘distracted from asking if their continued existence could 
prevent more productive social arrangements from becoming established, say, in the shape of 
formal markets’.119 
 
Other enthusiasts for guilds deal with the problem of guild discrimination against women by 
denying the evidence. Thus guild restrictions on women did not matter, according to Epstein, 
since masters’ daughters ‘did earn an income from craft work’.120 This is untrue, as shown in 
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a series of my publications, including several cited by Epstein.121 The only women who could 
legally engage in all aspects of a guilded craft were wives and widows of masters.122 
Daughters of masters were excluded from guild apprenticeship and forbidden many forms of 
work, not just in worsted production but in nearly all other guilded industries.123 Epstein adds 
that ‘non-guild related women also worked as spinners’.124 He carefully omits to mention that 
spinning was the only type of worsted work which women other than masters’ wives and 
widows were legally allowed to do, and that spinners’ wages were capped by the weavers’ 
guilds, pushing these women into poverty and dependency.125 Similar attempts by weavers’ 
guilds elsewhere in Europe to coerce female spinners into working for below-market wages 
were only prevented by diminishing the regulatory powers of the guilds.126 Women other than 
masters’ wives and widows who sought to carry out any other work in the worsted industry 
except for spinning were prosecuted by the guilds.127 Only by ignoring or denying the 
empirical findings in this way can one dismiss the damage which guilds inflicted on human 
capital investment through their discrimination against women. 
 
Another tactic is to claim that women’s productivity in the labour market was so low that it 
did not matter that guilds prevented them from increasing that productivity by obtaining 
industrial skills. Thus Epstein contends that my criticism of guilds’ prohibition on female 
training is based on the mistaken ‘assumption that female labour productivity was equivalent 
to male’.128 This echoes his statement in an earlier publication that ‘women were mostly 
restricted to activities learned informally at home’ and hence had no demand for guild 
apprenticeships.129 Such biological arguments, seeking to justify guilds’ exclusion of women 
from training on the grounds that women’s labour productivity was naturally low because of 
their domestic role, echo arguments used by guild masters at the time, concerned to defend 
their privileges against female competition.130 But Epstein’s argument is unsustainable. It is 
false to claim that I assume female labour productivity to be equal to male: on the contrary, 
detailed analysis of this precise question is provided in my book on women’s work published 
in 2003.131 It is also false to claim that guilds’ exclusion of women can be justified in terms of 
low labour productivity or domestic responsibilities. Analyses of women’s craft work by 
myself and others has refuted the claim that that pre-modern women had naturally low labour 
productivity or were necessarily attached to domestic responsibilities, and therefore had no 
demand for vocational training and no desire to do craft work.132 For one thing, in most 
western European societies, women married in their late twenties, 10-20 per cent of them 
never married at all, and at any one time more than half of all females of prime working age 
were not married. These demographic realities gave women strong incentives to invest in 
vocational skills and to practise them for long phases of their life-cycles. For another, females 
without guild licenses were regarded as dangerous competitors by male journeymen and 
masters, and persecuted when they encroached on tasks reserved for male guild members. 
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That is, women did not have such low labour productivity that they were ‘mostly restricted to 
domestic activities’, but rather had the desire and ability to work in guilded sectors. By 
excluding women from legally learning and practising most craft work, therefore, guilds were 
not simply reflecting women’s ‘naturally’ low labour productivity or their natural taste for 
domestic activities, but were deliberately enforcing institutionalized sex discrimination in the 
labour market.133  
 
A final argument employed by enthusiasts for guilds is to claim that guild restrictions on 
women’s training did not matter because pre-modern societies also contained other sources of 
sex discrimination. Thus Epstein dismisses guilds’ systematic exclusion of women by saying 
that ‘pre-modern gender discrimination was not invented by, and certainly not restricted to, 
guilds’.134 If this is intended to argue that other economic institutions in pre-modern Europe 
were also manipulated by male interest-groups in such a way as to obtain monopoly rents for 
themselves by excluding female competition in factor and product markets, it is true – as I 
have shown in detail, strong communal and seigneurial institutions were used in the same way 
as strong guilds.135 But this hardly exonerates the guilds from their enthusiastic participation 
in this systematic discrimination. If Epstein’s statement is intended as a ‘cultural’ argument 
that patriarchal beliefs were universal in pre-modern Europe and hence the institutional 
framework did not matter, the empirical findings suggest otherwise. Patriarchal beliefs may 
have been universal, but they had much less economic impact in the absence of institutional 
structures to give them practical expression. This is shown by the fact that women moved into 
almost any economic activity in pre-modern Europe as soon as guild regulations loosened 
sufficiently to stop keeping them out.136 Recent research on women’s work in the early 
modern Dutch Republic, for instance, has shown that in sectors unregulated by guilds, such as 
specialized spinning, female and male wages were equal.137 In sectors of the Dutch economy 
where guild rules were more liberal, such as retailing, female participation was significantly 
higher than in sectors where guilds were more restrictive, and when guild restrictions were 
relaxed female participation immediately increased.138 Institutions did matter, as they enabled 
individuals to organize themselves to work together in different ways, whether for efficient or 
inefficient purposes – enthusiasts for guilds would surely not claim that because beliefs in 
‘skilled training’ were universal in pre-modern Europe it did not therefore matter what 
institutions were available to ensure that such training actually occurred. Even if patriarchal 
beliefs were universal, the institutions to implement these beliefs varied. Strong guilds gave 
male masters the institutional capacity to act as a cartel to exclude women and to penalize 
free-riding by individual masters who would otherwise have wished to train and employ 
female workers. 
 
Institutions that exclude females from work and training do not just harm women; they also 
damage the wider economy. Recent studies provide striking estimates of the extent to which 
discrimination against women in human capital investment and labour force participation 
reduces GDP in modern developing economies. Thus, for instance, a 2007 United Nations 
report estimates that gender discrimination costs the Asian and Pacific region $43-$47 billion 
a year by keeping women out of the labour market, and another $16-$30 billion a year by 
restricting their access to education and training. If India’s female labour force participation 
rate reached parity with that of the United States, India’s GDP would increase by 4.2 per cent 
a year and its GDP growth rate would increase by 1.08 percentage points a year. Achieving 
US female labour force participation rates would increase the Malaysian GDP growth rate by 
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0.77 of a percentage point and the Indonesian rate by 0.56 of a percentage point.139 For the 
Asian and Pacific region as a whole, a 1 per cent increase in female education would increase 
GDP growth by 0.2 per cent, an estimate paralleled in a number of other studies of modern 
developing economies.140 Institutions, such as guilds, that restrict women’s access to training 
and employment therefore seem likely to reduce economic well-being more widely. 
 
3.4. Can the Evidence on Apprenticeship Be Reinterpreted? 
 
A fourth approach adopted by scholars who wish to maintain a favourable view of guilds’ role 
in skilled training is to challenge the case-study evidence on guild apprenticeship in pre-
modern Europe. This includes the finding that many crafts did not need long training; that 
industries without compulsory guild training were successful; that many guild apprentices 
found training useless and quit early when not legally prevented from doing so; and that 
guilds used apprenticeship regulations to restrict entry. 
 
A first important finding about guild apprenticeship that casts doubt on the human capital 
view of guilds is the evidence that many pre-modern crafts could be successfully practised by 
new entrants after a short period of training that did not involve any formal guild 
apprenticeship. This was the case in many English and Dutch worsted textile industries, as 
pointed out in my publications.141 In the West Riding of Yorkshire in the eighteenth century, 
contemporaries observed that ‘every man that wolde had libertie to be a clothier’.142 In 
eighteenth-century Somerset, contemporaries complained that of the several thousand 
weavers operating in and around Taunton ‘not Half of them have served Apprenticeships to 
the Weaving Trade’.143 It was also the case in the Württemberg Black Forest in the 1580s 
when the worsted industry was just starting up, before the first worsted-weavers’ guilds were 
formed. Thus in 1582, disgruntled masters of an urban guild of woollen-broadcloth-weavers 
(Tuchmacher) complained to the authorities that peasants and men of other crafts, ‘here and 
there also joined by women’, were setting up as worsted-weavers (Zeugmacher, 
Engelsaitmacher) and selling successfully on export markets, ‘after learning combing and 
weaving for only a few weeks or months’.144 
 
Such testimony by contemporaries is very awkward for the view that long guild 
apprenticeships were essential. In his recent reassertion of the importance of guilds’ training 
role, Epstein has claimed that evidence such as this example from Württemberg demonstrates 
not that prolonged guild training was not necessary, but rather ‘the effect of poor quality work 
on the craft’s reputation’.145 But there is no evidence for this claim. As is explained clearly in 
literature Epstein himself cites, at this period worsted production was just starting up in 
Württemberg.146 Worsted-weaving was not regarded as part of the legal monopoly of the 
woollen-weavers’ craft, and had not yet formed its own guild. This petition of 1582 cannot 
have anything to do with ‘the craft’s reputation’, therefore, since the worsted-weaving craft 
did not yet exist as an entity to have a reputation and the woollen-broadcloth-weaving craft 
had a reputation in a completely different set of wares and markets.  
 
A second empirical finding that undermines the human capital case for guilds is the 
proliferation of non-guild-trained workers all over Europe wherever guilds ceased to exist or 
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to enforce their apprenticeship regulations. Epstein seeks to dismiss this evidence by asserting 
that non-guilded labour could not substitute for guilded labour: ‘the more likely alternative’, 
he claims, was ‘that most formally untrained laborers were either lower- or semi-skilled 
workers who lacked the masters’ all-round expertise’.147 Epstein’s sole support for this 
conjecture is a footnote to Heaton’s study of the Yorkshire woollen and worsted industries 
which, on investigation, actually makes the contrary case. Heaton shows that insofar as 
apprenticeship survived in the woollen industry (where it was legally mandated) it was not 
enforced by guilds but rather undertaken through private agreements. In the worsted industry, 
apprenticeship was not legally mandated, so it was a matter of voluntary choice and was 
widely ignored (‘every man that wolde had libertie to be a clothier’148). At no point does 
Heaton refer to guild masters’ all-round expertise; rather he describes how the advancing 
division of labour and the increasing specialization of worsted workers progressively made 
apprenticeship obsolete for the vast majority of worsted producers.149 Heaton’s evidence for 
Yorkshire thus provides no support for Epstein’s view that guild apprenticeships were 
essential for ensuring industrial skills or that non-guild-trained workers could not substitute 
for guilded labour. Nor does Epstein’s unsubstantiated assertion account for the many guilded 
industries throughout Europe in which untrained ‘encroachers’ were regarded by guild 
masters as skilled enough to produce wares that were indistinguishable from their own. If 
these non-guild-trained competitors had lacked relevant ‘all-round expertise’, guild masters 
would not have needed to bother excluding them. 
 
A third finding about apprenticeship that casts doubt on the human capital case for guilds is 
the fact that in many guilded crafts apprentices complained of receiving poor training from 
their masters and quit their apprenticeships early, even though this disqualified them from 
subsequent mastership. My 2004 article provided several illustrative examples of such 
apprentices in early modern Württemberg.150 Epstein bizarrely takes these examples to show 
not that guilds failed to guarantee training but rather that ‘these apprentices had a ... 
sophisticated understanding of weaving skills’.151 This is absurd. Quitting apprenticeship 
before completing the legal training period was a serious decision, implying a calculation that 
the expected value of continuing guild training was less than the foregone earnings and 
disutility of remaining in service. An apprentice who quit may or may not have had a 
sophisticated understanding of the importance of craft skills, but he certainly had reached a 
clear conclusion that guild apprenticeship was not providing him with skills of value. Nor was 
this pattern unique to Württemberg. Examples of runaway apprentices can be found in many 
other European crafts and industries.152 Farr, for instance, has conjectured that interrupting 
one’s guild apprenticeship was the norm rather than the exception in pre-modern crafts.153 
Wallis adduces high quit-rates by early modern English apprentices as evidence that guild 
apprenticeships were neither necessary nor sufficient for providing training even in highly 
skilled urban crafts.154 Epstein’s argument is thus not only farfetched but at odds with the 
research literature on pre-modern craft apprenticeship. 
 
A fourth finding about apprenticeship that casts doubt on rosy views of how guilds guaranteed 
human capital investment is evidence that guilds had an alternative motivation for requiring 
apprenticeship – it helped them restrict entry. My publications have substantiated this 
argument, presenting quantitative and qualitative evidence showing how Württemberg 
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weavers’ guilds used apprenticeship regulations to restrict entry and protect monopoly 
rents.155 Enthusiasts for guilds seek to sweep such evidence under the carpet. Thus, for 
instance, Epstein claims on several occasions that the guild in my German case study cannot 
have used apprenticeship to ration entry because ‘masters set no limits to the number of 
apprentices a master could take’.156 This is simply untrue. The standard works on this 
industry, including my own study, document the apprenticeship quotas imposed by 
Württemberg worsted guilds, beginning in 1611 and becoming progressively more severe 
thereafter.157 Epstein tries to explain away the decline in the number of outside masters 
admitted to this industry after 1650 by claiming that it was not so much guild exclusivism as a 
lack of demand by outsiders to obtain mastership locally.158 This is also false. My case study 
presents unambiguous evidence showing that the guild imposed higher entry requirements on 
outside applicants, evinced outrage at the discovery that some masters from a neighbouring 
district had taken on ‘outsiders’ as apprentices without special state dispensation, and opposed 
settlement of outside weavers on the grounds that ‘the craft was overfilled’.159 Epstein claims 
that the guild cannot have become more exclusive after 1650 because the number of masters 
grew and average output fell, so the entry by outsiders declined simply because no outsider 
wanted to set up business locally.160 This too is false. My study presents evidence that the 
number of masters grew through internal increase since guild members often had more than 
one son who wanted to join the craft, enhancing the guild’s motivation to exclude outsiders.161 
Average output fell after 1650 not because of weak demand for guild masterships but because 
legal output quotas were fixed at lower levels.162 Epstein claims that guild output quotas 
cannot have impeded production since the guild quota was 50 cloths per annum but average 
output only 30-35.163 This is also false. My case study, as well as the standard nineteenth-
century study of this industry, explains clearly that the guild output quota was renegotiated at 
intervals between the weavers’ guilds and the merchant-dyers’ association, and therefore 
fluctuated over time. For extended periods in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these 
negotiated legal output quotas lay well below 50 cloths per annum, as shown by evidence 
presented in the standard works on the industry.164 Though Epstein footnotes the relevant 
literature, his factual assertions often depart from it without explanation or contrary 
evidence.165  
 
In a further attempt to shore up the case for guilds’ training role, Epstein seeks to reinterpret 
the evidence on guild output quotas in the Württemberg worsted industry by claiming that 
they show labour productivity to have been higher in the guild-regulated town than in the 
non-guild-regulated countryside. He begins with a misquotation, claiming that I state that 
‘labour productivity “should have been higher in the countryside, where corporative 
regulation might be expected to be weaker” ‘.166 In fact, what I write is that ‘Standard 
assumptions about proto-industrialization would predict higher output quotas in the 
countryside, where corporative regulation might be expected to be weaker’.167 Epstein’s 
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misquotation introduces three separate inaccuracies. First, he quotes me as writing ‘should 
have been’, whereas what I wrote was ‘Standard assumptions about proto-industrialization 
would predict’. Second, he ascribes the prediction to me, instead of to the standard theory of 
proto-industrialization, a theory that I show to be in error, since the evidence for Württemberg 
worsted guilds demonstrates that corporative regulation was equally strong in town and 
countryside. Third, Epstein substitutes the words ‘labour productivity’ for ‘output quotas’.  
 
This triply inaccurate quotation emboldens Epstein to advance the claim that my evidence 
shows that ‘26 of the top 27 weavers by output lived in the more regulated Wildberg towns 
[sic], suggesting that labour productivity was significantly higher where guild regulations on 
apprenticeship were strongest [sic] than in the less regulated countryside’.168 This statement 
contains multiple inaccuracies. First, the evidence in Table 7.1 of my book, from which 
Epstein takes these numbers, is for guild output quotas, not labour productivity. This is 
explicitly indicated in the sentence which Epstein misquotes (where he substitutes ‘labour 
productivity’ for ‘output quotas’), in the text of my book, and in the title of Table 7.1.169 As 
clearly discussed there, weavers in both town and country desired to product, and were 
capable of producing, larger numbers of cloths than they produced in practice. They produced 
so few cloths in practice because they were prevented from producing more by guild output 
quotas, which were legally fixed at lower levels for rural than for urban masters. Guild output 
quotas thus provide no information about labour productivity. Second, the countryside was 
not ‘less regulated’ than the town, as indicated by a wide array of evidence discussed in my 
book, including the fact that the guild actually imposed stricter output quotas on rural than 
urban weavers. Third, no material either in this passage or anywhere else in my book (or in 
any other work on the Württemberg worsted industry) provides support for the statement that 
‘guild regulations on apprenticeship’ were stronger in towns than in villages. On the contrary, 
quantitative evidence from the sections of my book relating to apprenticeship shows 
unambiguously that guild regulations on apprenticeship were enforced equally strictly in 
towns and villages.170 
 
Epstein’s final attempt at creative reinterpretation is directed at my evidence concerning guild 
limitations on the number of young men admitted to training. My study showed that high 
apprenticeship fees were imposed by guilds as barriers to entry, and that they were effective 
in excluding even those candidates whose other characteristics (gender, father’s occupation, 
community citizenship, religion, legitimate birth, etc.) might otherwise have entitled them to 
become apprentices.171 Epstein advances a convoluted argument that begins with a rhetorical 
question: ‘If lengthy apprenticeships were unnecessary, the only rationale for paying the fee 
would have been to provide an apprentice with a lucrative rent stream; but then, why spend 6 
useless years as an apprentice and not immediately become a master instead?’ Since it was 
not rational to make the latter choice, he claims, apprenticeship must have been ‘the chief 
available means to acquire scarce skills’ and hence the apprenticeship fee ‘would have acted 
as a bond on future performance, given asymmetric information about the apprentice’s ability 
and willingness to repay his training costs in full’.172  
 
This ignores several key aspects of guild apprenticeship. It was not open to a young man ‘to 
immediately become a master’ without putting in the compulsory period of apprenticeship 
and journeymanship required by guild regulations. Without presenting one’s guild 
apprenticeship certificate one could not obtain employment as a journeyman, without 
presenting one’s journeyman tramp-book and master-piece one could not obtain one’s 
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mastership certificate, and without a mastership certificate one could not set up in business as 
a master in any jurisdiction in which guild regulations were enforced.173 Epstein’s rhetorical 
question thus falls flat: the rationale for paying the apprenticeship fee and spending a given 
number of ‘useless years as an apprentice’ was that guilds, community jurisdictions, and state 
officials required this as a prerequisite for working independently as a master.  
 
Epstein’s attempted reinterpretation of guild apprenticeship fees falls equally flat. Not only 
was there a very good reason to pay the fee and serve one’s ‘useless years’ as an apprentice 
(the guild required it of anyone who desired ultimately to enjoy the benefits of guild 
mastership), but there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the view that the apprenticeship 
fee was ‘a bond on future performance’ to ensure that an apprentice would repay his training 
costs. Indeed, this interpretation of apprenticeship has attracted criticism in recent scholarship 
on guilds.174 For one thing, although Epstein describes apprentices as ‘children’, they were 
not.175 Here, as in most other pre-modern European crafts, apprentices were young men in the 
second half of their teens and the first half of their twenties (aged 14-24 years, according to 
the Wildberg censuses of 1717 and 1722).176 Youths of this age were regarded by 
contemporaries as productive enough to cover their consumption costs, and often had prior 
employment history, so they were already of utility to their masters from the beginning of the 
apprenticeship.177 Studies of apprentices in England and other European societies reveal the 
same to be true in other pre-modern crafts.178 These findings have begun to evoke scepticism 
about whether it is justified to regard guild apprenticeship fees and longer-than-necessary 
apprenticeship periods as bonds on future performance rather than as barriers to entry.179  
 
The evidence on guild apprenticeship does not, therefore, support the view that guilds were 
either necessary or sufficient for human capital investment. Contemporary testimony that 
guilded crafts could be practised effectively without guild apprenticeship cannot be dismissed 
by claiming that non-guild-trained practitioners were damagingly unskilled, since many crafts 
were guilded in some European societies and unguilded (but successful) in others, and non-
guild-trained practitioners competed successfully with guild masters. Moreover, guild 
apprentices themselves complained about receiving poor training and often voted with their 
feet by quitting apprenticeship early. Guild apprenticeship existed not because it was efficient 
for human capital investment but because it helped guilds defend their members’ profits by 
restricting entry, as shown by exclusion of outsiders by strong guilds. Guild apprenticeship 
fees were not bonds on performance by unproductive child workers but entry barriers 
imposed on productive young men who were already of utility to their masters. Apprentices 
were willing to pay high fees not because they valued guild training but because they valued 
the guild license without which they were not allowed to practise the craft legally. 
 
3.5. Was It Only in the Worsted Industry that Guild Training was Unnecessary? 
 
A fifth approach adopted by scholars who wish to maintain a favourable view of guilds’ role 
in training is to claim that contrary evidence derives solely from the industry analysed in my 
                                                   
173
 As made clear by the discussion in Ogilvie 1997, pp. 139-55, and in Troeltsch 1897, ch. 4. 
174
 See, for instance, Wallis 2005. 
175
 Epstein 2008, para. 28. 
176
 Author’s calculations from HSAS A573 Bü. 6965 (1717); HSAS A573 Bü. 6966 (1722). 
177
 On the age at which youths of both sex in this economy were regarded as covering their 
consumption costs, see Ogilvie 2003, pp. 99-102. 
178
 On the fact that apprentices were not children but rather young men who often had previous work 
experience and useful skills, see Wallis 2005. For further data on apprentices’s ages in pre-modern 
Europe, demonstrating that they were not unemployable children but potentially productive young men, 
see Hanawalt 1993, p. 113; Davis 1971, pp. 41-75; Nicholas 1995, pp. 1108. On how apprentices in the 
Yorkshire worsted industry had ‘a practical acquaintance with some phases of the industry’ before 
taking their indentures, see Heaton 1965, p. 305. 
179
 See, for instance, Wallis 2005. 
 29
own case study, namely worsted textile production.180 My 2004 article certainly focuses on 
the early modern European worsted textile industry, since the debate about guilds is still sadly 
lacking in rigorous empirical analyses.181 But the arguments presented there have a wider 
relevance. Textiles were by far the largest branch of pre-modern industry, as recently pointed 
out by Soly: ‘the most important export-oriented industry with respect to capital investment, 
employment, and profits was textile manufacturing’.182 Worsteds – also called ‘New 
Draperies’ – were a rapidly expanding, mass-market branch of the early modern European 
textile industry.183 Although there were branches of textile production that were more highly 
skilled – particularly silk and high-quality broadcloth production – the greatest expansion in 
the textile industry in early modern Europe took place not in these luxury branches but rather 
in the low-quality, mass-market branches of worsteds, lighter woollens, linens, and cottons – 
sectors that expanded so fast in export-markets that they have often been called ‘proto-
industrial’.184 Findings for the worsted industry thus refer to a large and rapidly expanding 
component of by far the largest branch of industry before and during the first Industrial 
Revolution. 
 
Furthermore, evidence undermining the human capital interpretation of guilds is not restricted 
to the worsted sector. As my publications have documented, worsted production was only one 
of many early modern industrial activities that were guilded in some parts of Europe and 
unguilded in others. Other examples include linen weaving, cotton weaving, scythe making, 
trimmings making, lace making, and the making of small iron goods. These industries were 
guilded in many parts of Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Bohemia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and 
Greece, but unguilded in most parts of England, Flanders, Scotland, Switzerland, and 
Ireland.185 In an article of 2005, I present evidence from a range of industries, including high-
quality urban crafts, that undermines the claim that guilds were necessary for skilled 
training.186 There is thus copious evidence from other sectors than worsted textiles that guilds 
were not necessary to provide levels of skilled training sufficient to power the dynamism of 
long-lived and successful pre-modern industries. This suggests that the detailed analysis of 
the institutional requirements for human capital investment provided in my case study of the 
European worsted sector is likely to find many parallels in pre-modern industry. As discussed 
below in Section 7, such rigorous, comparative empirical studies of particular industries are 
an important desideratum for future research, as only they can advance the debate about 
guilds’ importance for human capital investment. 
 
3.6. Can European Evidence Be Reinterpreted to Rehabilitate Guilds’ Role in Training? 
 
A final approach adopted by scholars who wish to reassert the human capital interpretation of 
guilds is to dispute the evidence from cross-European comparisons. As I have previously 
pointed out, the fact that one and the same industry could be subject to compulsory guild 
apprenticeship in some European economies and free of guild apprenticeship in others casts 
doubt on the view that guild apprenticeship was economically essential. Further doubt is cast 
by the fact that some of the dynamic and successful textile industries in the centuries before 
the industrial revolution developed in rural regions of England where guild apprenticeship 
played little or no role. Epstein has sought to dismiss such European comparisons on the 
grounds that that apprenticeship was widespread in England into the mid-eighteenth 
century.187 There are three reasons why this claim is irrelevant.  
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First, apprenticeship does not require guilds, as Epstein himself admits when he 
acknowledges that in Yorkshire apprenticeship contracts were monitored by Justices of the 
Peace (public magistrates) rather than guilds.188 The Yorkshire woollen and worsted industries 
were phenomenally successful, and have been estimated to account for 60 per cent of British 
output in the wool textile sector by the eighteenth century.189 Furthermore, as I have pointed 
out, and as confirmed by the Heaton study to which Epstein refers, non-guild apprenticeship 
was widespread in the English worsted and woollen industries from the sixteenth century 
on.190 The prevalence of non-guild apprenticeship in a whole range of pre-industrial crafts has 
been emphasized by recent work on England,191 the Low Countries,192 France,193 Italy,194 
Russia,195 the United States,196 and Canada.197 Thus, for instance, Mocarelli finds that in an 
Italian database of over one thousand guilds, ‘in most of the guilds recorded (677) 
apprenticeships were not officially recognised ... increasingly a private contract between the 
parties was adopted. A contract was signed between the master craftsman and the parents of 
the young person who wished to learn the craft.’198 Likewise, for the Netherlands, Davids 
points out that 
it was evidently possible in Amsterdam to conclude formal arrangements concerning 
occupational instruction between a individual master and the parents or guardians of a 
prospective pupil even if there was no corporate institution which could test and 
certify its outcome. Guilds were not necessary agencies for the enforcement of 
apprenticeship contracts. If one of the parties defaulted, the aggrieved person could 
always have recourse to the courts.199 
The widespread evidence of non-guild apprenticeships undermines earlier claims that guilds 
were essential for enforcing apprenticeships because (as had previously been argued) they 
prescribed masterpieces, solved free-rider problems, guaranteed contract enforcement, or 
ensured apprentices were optimally distributed among masters.200 It also casts more general 
doubt on the idea that guilds were necessary to ensure human capital investment, even in 
activities where prolonged training was important. Much of the English apprenticeship to 
which Epstein refers took place in a non-guild framework, and hence the existence of English 
apprentices does not tell us anything about the importance of guilds. 
 
Second, guild apprenticeship was also widespread in crafts for which skilled training was not 
economically necessary, as shown by the evidence for the worsted and woollen industries all 
over early modern Europe.201 This is because guild apprenticeship served other purposes than 
economic efficiency. In particular, as discussed in detail above, guild apprenticeship 
requirements constituted a barrier to entry erected for the purpose of creating monopoly 
profits for guild members. Thus the prevalence of guild apprenticeship in any given economic 
sector did not show that the sector required skilled training, but merely that its guilds were in 
a position legally to require guild apprenticeship. 
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Third, apprentices could be numerous in absolute terms even in a society (such as early 
modern England) in which guilds were being circumvented or being compelled to relaxed 
their regulations in order to survive. What is relevant to assessing the importance of guilds is 
not the absolute numbers of apprentices, nor even the absolute numbers of guild apprentices, 
but rather the relative number of men and women practising a craft with and without 
apprenticeship. Contemporary documents attest to a large proportion of non-apprenticeship-
trained practitioners in eighteenth-century English woollen and worsted industries – c. 50 per 
cent in Taunton in 1702, c. 90 per cent in the West Riding of Yorkshire c. 1800.202 Thus a 
particular sector or an entire economy could have large absolute numbers of apprentices 
without this demonstrating that a majority of practitioners pursued apprenticeships, and hence 
without providing any support for the view that apprenticeship (whether guild-mandated or 
privately agreed) was necessary for successful industrial practice.  
 
The attempts of enthusiasts for guilds to reinterpret international comparisons in support of 
their views thus backfires, partly as a result of a failure to disentangle the various theoretical 
issues at stake. Until a clear distinction is drawn between the issues of how much training was 
needed, whether it was of a type that could only be provided through formal apprenticeship, 
and whether guilds were needed for apprenticeship, enthusiasts for guilds will continue to 
make little useful contribution to the debate about human capital accumulation in pre-modern 
economies. 
 
4. Did Guilds Favour Technological Innovation? 
 
A third theory advanced by enthusiasts is that guilds facilitated technological innovation. This 
runs counter to contemporary complaints – and historical evidence – that guilds frequently 
opposed the introduction of new techniques. But enthusiasts for guilds argue that such 
evidence has been misunderstood for centuries: according to this view, many industrial 
innovations were adopted without guild opposition; guilds only opposed labour-saving and 
capital-intensive innovations, while favouring labour- and skill-intensive ones; many 
innovations opposed by guilds were impractical in any case; and even when guilds did oppose 
innovations it did no harm since innovators simply evaded the regulations.  
 
The most extreme enthusiasts for guilds have gone so far as to argue that guilds positively 
encouraged innovation. In 1998, Epstein put forward ‘a theory of guild innovation’,203 
claiming that guilds ‘produced and adopted innovations’204 and ‘increased the supply of 
technology systematically’.205 He postulated four mechanisms by which guilds did this: they 
offered monopoly rents to innovators, overcoming disincentives to innovation created by the 
difficulty of charging people to use a public good such as information; they promoted spatial 
clustering, easing technology transfer; they required apprenticeships, guaranteeing smooth 
transmission of technical expertise across generations; and they compelled journeymen to 
travel, overcoming barriers to diffusion of new techniques.206 Through these four guild 
mechanisms, he argued, ‘craft-based invention ... came close to resembling an ideal market 
structure for innovation’.207 In more recent elaborations of this view, Epstein claims that craft 
guilds ‘lowered the costs of absorbing technical information from immigrant technicians’,208 
‘devised institutional arrangements that sustained craft mobility and raised the potential rate 
of technological innovation’,209 and ‘promoted collective knowledge sharing and 
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invention’.210 Technological leadership moved from the European continent to Britain after c. 
1675, he argues, ‘largely thanks to skilled individuals trained by guilds’.211 His conclusion is 
that ‘the main direct source of pre-modern technical innovation was the craft guild’.212  
 
There is a theoretical incoherence, however, at the heart of the claim that guilds facilitated 
technological innovation. On the one hand, guilds are supposed to have been too weak to 
enforce harmful regulations, but on the other they are supposed to have been strong enough to 
enforce beneficial ones. The argument that guilds were too weak to enforce regulations 
blocking innovations is inconsistent with the claim that they were strong enough to enforce 
regulations encouraging innovations, e.g. by offering monopoly rents to inventors, requiring 
journeymen to travel, enforcing apprenticeship, or promoting spatial clustering. One can 
defend guilds, at least in theory, either by arguing they were so weak they were harmless or 
by claiming they were so strong they were beneficial – but not both at the same time. 
 
Empirically, the claim that guilds were too weak (or too well-meaning) to oppose innovations 
can be refuted on all counts. First, while it is true that some industrial innovations were 
adopted without detectable guild resistance, this was only true if that innovation did not 
threaten the well-being of established guild masters. The same guilds bitterly resisted other 
innovations that they did perceive as endangering their interests, as shown by evidence from 
practically every pre-modern craft – the reason guilds came to be seen as technophobic.  
 
Second, it is false to claim that guilds only opposed innovations that were labour-saving and 
capital-intensive, but favoured ones that were labour- and skills-intensive. Thus, as showed by 
my German case study, Württemberg weavers’ guilds opposed the introduction of innovative, 
skills-intensive worsted and hybrid textiles throughout most of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Furthermore, even if guilds had only opposed labour-saving innovations, that 
would still have reduced efficiency by compelling people to produce at higher cost.  
 
Third, it is illogical to argue that guilds only opposed ‘impractical’ innovations. If a technique 
was no good there would be no reason to oppose it, and if guild masters viewed opposition to 
it as worth investing in, then they believed it practical enough to harm them.  
 
Fourth, guild opposition to innovations did not always fail because of illegal adoption, threats 
of emigration, or competition from more liberal regimes. Illegality is costly, as shown by 
studies of the informal sector in modern developing economies; this deterred the marginal 
innovator. Emigration is costly, too, as shown by studies quantifying the non-trivial 
transaction costs and loss of social capital incurred by migrants; these costs, too, deterred the 
marginal innovator. The existence of more liberal regimes elsewhere does not inevitably lead 
to liberalization locally. Inefficient institutions can be protected from competition by a wide 
variety of factors, including political coercion, trade protection, market segmentation, 
transportation costs, and migration restrictions. Their redistributive importance to powerful 
interest groups alone can enable inefficient institutions to survive for generations, sometimes 
for centuries, despite coexisting with more efficient institutional frameworks – an issue 
discussed below in Section 7.213 
 
The argument that strong guilds positively encouraged technological innovation is even more 
questionable. For one thing, the claim that strong guilds’ monopoly rents could have 
encouraged innovators is simply a theoretical proposition for which neither economic theory 
nor empirical studies provide support. Even those economic models postulating that 
monopoly might favour innovation require there to be no barriers to entry in order for the 
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monopolist to have good incentives to innovate – a condition violated by pre-modern guilds. 
Guilds did certainly generate monopoly rents, but there is no evidence that these rents 
rewarded innovation.214 
 
Second, guilds were neither necessary nor sufficient for enforcing the spatial clustering which 
might have favoured horizontal transmission of technical expertise. Industrial agglomeration 
is widely observed in most economies, including modern ones, because it brings a whole 
array of advantages that have been quite thoroughly analyzed by economists; it does not 
require guilds. Conversely, guilds arose in many early modern crafts where there were not 
enough guild members in the same locality to bring about any industrial agglomeration.215 
 
Third, guild apprenticeship and journeymanship were neither necessary nor sufficient for 
transmitting technical expertise smoothly between generations. As already discussed in the 
preceding section of this paper, masters who failed to train their apprentices were not 
punished and widows who never had any formal guild training practised legally. Conversely, 
‘encroachers’ who had been denied a guild training somehow managed to learn the relevant 
technical expertise without it. Furthermore, many successful European industries evidently 
ensured that techniques were transmitted successfully while dispensing with guild 
apprenticeships.  
 
Fourth, guild tramping requirements were neither necessary nor sufficient for diffusing 
innovations geographically. Young workers in pre-modern Europe were highly mobile even 
in unguilded crafts, proto-industries, agriculture, and labouring. The Netherlands, where 
guilds did not compel journeymen to tramp, enjoyed legendary labour mobility and 
technological innovation.  
 
Furthermore, regulations guilds imposed for other reasons could exert unintended negative 
effects on innovation. Guild production regulations were imposed to control quality (and 
monitor unlicensed production), but stipulating precisely how a product was supposed to be 
made could deter innovation by ossifying production methods and excluding even desirable 
deviations. Guild price regulations were imposed to enhance social solidarity (and restrict 
competition), but could also deter innovators by denying them profits from underselling 
competitors. Guild admissions restrictions were imposed to ensure craft skills (and exclude 
entrants), but could also deter innovation by compelling a limited number of practitioners to 
spend many years investing in learning a particular set of techniques. Guild prohibitions on 
occupational mobility were imposed to ensure that skills were required (and to exclude 
entrants), but they endowed masters with a heavy investment in human capital specific to a 
particular technique and set of products, creating incentives to resist any technical change that 
threatened the value of their investment. Guild demarcations between different crafts were 
imposed to maintain product quality and labour skills (and to protect monopoly rents), but 
could also deter innovation by preventing the productive exchange of ideas between adjacent 
bodies of knowledge. 
 
Cross-European comparisons cast serious doubt on claims that guilds encouraged 
technological innovation. In the worsted textile sector, for instance, many strongly guilded 
industries (e.g. in German-speaking central Europe) were technologically backward, while 
many weakly guilded industries (e.g. in the Netherlands and England) were highly innovative. 
The West Riding of Yorkshire was as close as possible to being wholly unguilded, yet its 
worsted industry was the most successful in eighteenth-century Europe, partly because of its 
exceptional receptiveness to technological innovations. Many other crafts, as we have seen, 
were strongly guilded in some European societies, weakly guilded in others, and wholly 
unguilded in still others; and there is no evidence whatsoever that technological innovation 
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was greater in the strongly guilded ones. Guilds were thus neither necessary nor sufficient for 
innovation. On the contrary: in many cases unguilded or weakly guilded industries were at the 
forefront of inventing, adopting, and diffusing new techniques. 
 
The scholar who has most forcefully advocated the view that guilds favoured innovation, 
Epstein, has recently sought to defend it against these arguments. First, he has reiterated the 
pronouncement that guild opposition to innovations was harmless (or even beneficial) 
because many innovations opposed by guilds were impractical or dangerous, and because 
guilds could be circumvented anyway. Second, while disavowing his previous claims that 
guilds directly favoured innovation through monopolies and industrial clustering, he has 
repeated with still greater conviction that guilds indirectly created positive externalities for 
innovation through apprenticeship and journeymanship. Third, he has sought to discredit 
evidence that contradicts the ‘innovation’ view of guilds by seeking to reinterpret the 
empirical findings in my German case study. Finally, he attempts to dispute cross-European 
comparisons, claiming that they support the idea that guilds favoured technological 
innovation.  
 
4.1. Was Guild Opposition to Innovation Harmless? 
 
Did guild opposition to innovations not matter? Earlier versions of this view had claimed that 
although guilds did undeniably sometimes oppose innovations, this was harmless because 
many new techniques were economically impractical. But, as I have asked in previous 
publications, if an innovation was impractical why oppose it? The fact that a guild invested 
resources in opposing a technique suggests that its members regarded it as practical enough to 
harm them.216  
 
The recent restatement of the ‘technological’ case for guilds by Epstein now disavows ever 
having sought to justify guild opposition to innovation on the grounds that the techniques they 
opposed were impracticable.217 Instead, Epstein claims, the techniques opposed by guilds 
were harmful, so guilds positively benefited the economy by prohibiting them. Guild 
opposition to innovations was justified, according to Epstein, because innovations ‘could 
cause serious harm to high quality cloth’, ‘might be untested technically and commercially’, 
or ‘relied on tacit knowledge that was expensive to learn and diffuse’. So innovations were 
only opposed in order ‘to defend the guild’s reputation for quality and prevent undercutting 
by free-riding masters’.218  
 
These claims are absurd. If a new technique could cause ‘serious harm’ to high-quality cloth, 
then merchants and customers would refuse to buy it, no weaver would introduce it, and the 
guild would have no need to oppose it. If a new technique reduced the quality of the product 
but customers demanded it anyway (e.g., because it was less expensive or had other desirable 
characteristics), then opposing its introduction would harm those customers as well as the 
producers who wanted to shift to a lower quality-price combination. If the defects produced 
by the new technique were hidden, then according to enthusiasts for guilds, guild quality 
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controls would prevent any wares with defects from reaching the market anyway. (In practice, 
of course, as we saw in Section 3, early modern European industries possessed a rich variety 
of institutional arrangements for monitoring quality independently of guilds.) If a new 
technique was ‘untested’, then the craftsman introducing it would be incurring all the costs 
and risks, and the guild would have no reason to oppose it. If a new technique ‘relied on tacit 
knowledge that was expensive to learn and diffuse’, there is no clear reason why a guild 
should oppose it, since all its members would have the same tacit knowledge and hence would 
be able to copy and benefit from the new technique.  
 
These claims are not only logically absurd, but empirically unsubstantiated. Epstein himself 
phrases them in terms of ‘could’, ‘might be’, and ‘seems plausible that’.219 He presents no 
evidence that the new techniques so widely opposed by guilds throughout pre-modern Europe 
were ones with such ‘harmful’ characteristics. The footnotes attached to his speculations 
consist of one reference to an unpublished 2005 Ph.D. thesis (supervised by Epstein) and one 
to an unpublished 2006 working paper by Epstein himself which simply makes the same 
assertions as his 2008 paper, often in precisely the same words.220  
 
A final justification for viewing guild opposition to innovations as harmless is that, according 
to Epstein, craft guilds ‘could not forbid non-members from innovating’.221 If ‘non-members’ 
refers to persons seeking to produce within the same locality as the guild, this statement is 
untrue. Every guild charter in Europe explicitly prohibited local non-guild-members from 
producing the wares legally defined as the exclusive ‘privilege’ of that guild. If ‘non-
members’ refers to non-guilded producers in the countryside surrounding an urban guild, then 
this implies that guild opposition to innovations was only harmless where guilds were too 
weak to prevent non-guild competition, as in many English and Dutch textile regions; 
however, this cannot be what is meant, since Epstein rejects the standard characterization of 
English and Dutch guilds as ‘weak’, a view this paper assesses below in Section 6.222 If by 
‘non-members’, Epstein refers to guilded producers in other localities, and is thus postulating 
that European guilds efficiently competed each other into permitting technological 
innovation, then the empirical record decisively refutes this view. Practitioners in the weakly 
guilded or unguilded worsted industries of the Netherlands and England adopted innovations 
that were opposed by worsted guilds in other European regions such as Württemberg, yet 
English and Dutch competition failed to compete the technological conservatism of 
Württemberg guilds out of existence. The technologically stagnant Württemberg worsted 
guilds survived for centuries by selling to markets protected by trade barriers, transport costs, 
and political coercion.223  
 
Guild opposition to innovation was not harmless. Contemporaries’ urgent desire to adopt 
these innovations in the teeth of guild opposition undermines the view that the new techniques 
were either impracticable or harmful. Competition from other guilds was ineffectual in 
preventing guilds from implementing damaging restrictions on innovation, as shown by cross-
European comparisons within the same branch of industry. Competition from unguilded rural 
producers was more effectual in reducing the damage caused by guild opposition to 
innovations – but only by bringing about a fundamental weakening of the whole guild regime, 
as in the Netherlands and England. 
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4.2. Did Guilds Encourage Innovation through Apprenticeship? 
 
Faced with my comprehensive refutation of the theoretical and empirical basis for the notion 
that guilds directly encouraged technological innovation through monopolies and or industrial 
clustering,224 enthusiasts for guilds have now seemingly abandoned these views. As the 
scholar most closely associated with them, Epstein has recently denied ever having held 
them.225 His only remaining argument, repeated with ever greater conviction, is that guilds 
indirectly created positive externalities for innovation through enforcing guild training, 
particularly apprenticeship, but also through journeymanship.226 
 
The view that guild apprenticeship created positive externalities for technological innovation 
is untenable. As discussed in detail in Section 3 of this paper, many pre-modern crafts did not 
require formal apprenticeship; in those that did, apprenticeship did not need guilds. Even 
strong guilds often did not enforce training, since they were only interested in apprenticeship 
as an entry barrier. Non-guild-trained ‘encroachers’ learned technical expertise without guild 
training. Many of the most technologically innovative and economically successful industries 
in pre-modern Europe did not require guild apprenticeships.227 Epstein’s reassertion of the 
view that apprenticeship created ‘positive externalities’ for technological innovation does not 
even seek to address these arguments. 
 
Nor can one maintain the argument that guilds favoured the diffusion of technological 
innovations through journeymanship which led to migration. As my publications have 
discussed, although guild journeymen often did migrate, so too did many non-guilded young 
workers. Many technologically innovative European industries did not require journeymen to 
migrate, and some did not have guild journeymen at all.228 Epstein has sought to dispute these 
arguments by asserting that guild-trained journeymen migrated ‘independently from and 
frequently in opposition to organized guilds’ and that tramping by journeymen ‘emerged as a 
means to diffuse information about labour markets and to share tacit knowledge’.229 Both of 
these statements are false. Most guilds obliged journeymen to go ‘on the tramp’ for a 
minimum number of years, journeymen who failed to do so were penalized, and Dutch guilds 
are explicitly singled out in the historiography as having been more liberal than other 
European guilds because they did not oblige journeymen to travel.230 The tramping of 
journeymen thus did not emerge spontaneously as a means to ‘diffuse information’ and ‘share 
tacit knowledge’ but rather was part of the complex framework of barriers to entry imposed 
by guild masters in order to sustain their monopoly profits. Labour migration, with any 
attendant technological diffusion that came in its train, was already high in pre-modern 
Europe without guild journeymanship, as discussed in my previous publications,231 and as 
demonstrated by the Dutch case.232 
 
Enthusiasts for guilds have thus tacitly abandoned previous exaggerated claims about the 
technological benefits created by guilds through monopoly rents or industrial clustering. The 
new, reduced-form version of the ‘innovation’ case for guilds now merely claims that guild-
mandated apprenticeship and journeymanship indirectly favoured technological innovation. 
But even these more modest arguments fail to hold up to theoretical or empirical examination. 
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Neither guild apprenticeship nor guild journeymanship were necessary for technological 
innovation, there is no evidence that they favoured innovation, and many of the most 
technologically innovative and economically successful industries in pre-modern Europe had 
other institutional arrangements.233 
 
4.3. Can the Württemberg Evidence Be Reinterpreted to Show Guilds Favoured Innovation? 
 
A third approach adopted by Epstein in the attempt to maintain the innovation case for guilds 
is to advance a creative reinterpretation of the evidence in my German case study. First, he 
tries to claim that Württemberg worsted-weavers’ guilds might have opposed technological 
innovations after 1650 because they were oppressed by merchants, but did not do so before 
this date.234 This is false. These weavers’ guilds already opposed technological innovations in 
the period before 1650, as shown by an example I discuss from 1619-21, when an Italian 
merchant invited by the Württemberg prince to introduce new French and Dutch techniques 
into the primitive Black Forest worsted technology encountered such vehement opposition 
from local merchants’, dyers’, and weavers’ guilds that he departed and refused all invitations 
to return.235 There is no evidence of a switch in the guilds’ strategy in 1650. Guilds sometimes 
opposed new techniques and sometimes let them pass. If an innovation could be adopted 
without threatening the well-being of established guild masters, they had no incentive to resist 
it. But the same guilds bitterly resisted other innovations that they perceived as endangering 
their interests.236 
 
Building on this alleged strategy switch in 1650, Epstein then seeks to explain away these 
guilds’ opposition to innovation in terms of ‘linked contractual charges imposed by the 
merchants’ in the post-1650 period.237 Not only was there no strategy switch. But this 
argument ignores the fact that the merchants were guilded craftsmen as well – merchant-dyers 
– who themselves also opposed technological innovation, and used their guild-like association 
to enforce this preference.238 The technological sclerosis of the industry intensified after 1650 
not because of ‘charges imposed by the merchants’ but because of the malign interaction 
between the rent-seeking incentives created by multiple interlocking sets of guild 
privileges.239 
 
A final inaccuracy on which Epstein seeks to build a creative reinterpretation of the 
Württemberg evidence relates to output and productivity. Epstein claims that per capita output 
in the Württemberg worsted industry rose from c. 35 per annum in the period 1650-1730 to c. 
50 per annum 1730-80. This, he claims, demonstrates a ‘near 50 percent increase in labour 
productivity ... [which] must have been the result of endogenous improvements’ caused by 
guilds.240 This is a wildly inaccurate misinterpretation of data presented in my book.241 Table 
7.3, to which Epstein refers, shows the changing legal quota of worsteds which the merchant-
dyers’ association formally agreed to accept from each weaver. This quota was fixed 
institutionally through inter-guild negotiations; it did not reflect economic realities such as 
labour productivity or technical capability. Each local weaver was technically capable of 
producing well in excess of 50 cloths per annum, as I discuss in my study; it was only because 
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of guild output quotas that weavers produced below this level, as shown by complaints by the 
weavers themselves. The guild output quota changed at intervals over the two centuries 
during which the industry remained in being.242 The quota did not move in any clear direction, 
but rather fluctuated upwards and downwards throughout the entire history of the industry in 
response to the changing political balance between merchant-dyers’ and weavers’ guilds, 
among different districts’ weavers’ guilds, and among different sub-groups of weavers who 
secured different legal quotas. Epstein thus bases his claim that labour productivity increased 
‘endogenously’ on data which have nothing to do with productivity but rather reflect guild 
regulations. There is thus no evidence for any productivity increase. 
 
4.4. Can European Evidence Be Reinterpreted to Rehabilitate Guilds’ Role in Innovation? 
 
A final line of approach in the attempt to maintain the innovation view of guilds is to dispute 
the evidence from cross-European comparisons. As I and others have pointed out, 
technological innovations were developed and adopted very rapidly in the Netherlands during 
its ‘Golden Age’ (1550-1670) and in England after c. 1600, precisely the period when Dutch 
and English guilds were losing many economic powers. Many of the most technologically 
innovative textile industries in Europe arose and flourished in societies, regions, or locations 
where guilds were weak or non-existent. Alternative institutional frameworks provided more 
favourable incentives than guilds to invent and diffuse innovative industrial techniques.243 
 
Epstein, however, claims – without evidence – that ‘virtually all technical knowledge’ in pre-
modern Europe was generated by crafts (which were guilded), while few innovations were 
generated in ‘proto-industrial’ locations (which he implies were non-guilded).244 His sole 
footnote is to a single article on patents (which does not address this issue) and his own past 
papers (which provide no evidence on it).245 If anything, the evidence on patents casts doubt 
on the notion that guilds were essential for technological innovation in early modern Europe. 
In the Dutch ‘Golden Age’, as Davids has pointed out, the patent represented an effective 
alternative to the guild in providing incentives for the invention and diffusion of 
innovations.246 Important innovations in the pre-modern European worsted industry, as 
demonstrated in my own publications, were invented by unguilded female spinners and 
unguilded rural weavers, but were opposed by guild masters who feared the new practices 
would endanger their own rents.247 Insofar as technological innovations were introduced in a 
guild framework, this was simply because many craftsmen in pre-modern Europe were legally 
compelled to operate in guilds – not because the guild framework was favourable to 
innovation. 
 
Epstein then makes the equally unsupported assertion that unguilded forms of industrial 
organization were ‘comparatively marginal and not particularly progressive’. He explains 
away the case of England, where an increasing number of important and successful industries 
after c. 1550 were weakly guilded or guild-free, by claiming – again, without evidence248 – 
that before the later seventeenth century England got most of its innovations via guild-trained 
migrants from the Continent.249 In fact, unguilded forms of industrial organization were often 
found in putting-out systems, which were widespread throughout pre-modern Europe, 
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expanded rapidly, and often surpassed the size of urban guilded crafts.250 Epstein’s dismissal 
of centralized manufactories is disingenuous, since it was often opposition from craft guilds 
that held them back, where they did not stagnate as merchant-guild monopolies or state-
owned enterprises.251 Unguilded proto-industries and manufactories were not ‘progressive’, in 
Epstein’s view. But they often introduced new products, working processes, and techniques 
that were resisted by guilds.252 Patents, premia, and legal enforcement of personal trademarks 
were successful in economies such as England and the Netherlands, where (as discussed 
below in Section 6) guilds’ ability to enforce their regulations and privileges began to loosen 
at a relatively early date.253 England is certainly known to have derived many technological 
innovations from the European continent.254 This does not demonstrate that English industries 
failed to generate new techniques of their own, but rather that they were exceptionally open to 
new techniques from anywhere. Indeed, as Mokyr has discussed, new techniques that had 
been invented in continental Europe were often put into business use for the first time in 
England, precisely because of the superior institutional flexibility of English factor markets, 
in which the limited influence of guilds was one component.255 This was recognized by 
contemporaries, such as the Swiss calico-printer who in 1766 quoted a popular saying to the 
effect that ‘for a thing to be perfect it must be invented in France and worked out in 
England’.256 
 
Little of substance is provided by attempts to resuscitate the case for guilds as a source of 
technological innovation – whether direct or indirect. The claim that guild opposition to 
technical innovations was beneficial is theoretically incoherent and empirically 
unsubstantiated. The idea that guilds favoured technological innovation through monopoly 
rents and industrial agglomeration has now been abandoned even by the most devoted 
enthusiasts for guilds. The notion that guild apprenticeship was essential for transmitting 
technical knowledge falls afoul of findings concerning the many innovative and successful 
unguilded industries in early modern Europe, as well as the evidence in Section 3 on the 
widespread irrelevance of apprenticeship for training. The idea that guild journeymen were 
essential for diffusing innovations is undermined by findings on labour mobility and 
journeymanship across Europe. Attempts to reinterpret my German case-study and cross-
European comparisons provide no support for the view that guilds encouraged technical 
innovation. 
 
5. Was Guild Rent-Seeking Beneficial? 
 
Some enthusiasts claim that guilds benefitted pre-modern economies by making politics work 
better. Thus Putnam et al. argue that guilds in medieval Italian cities generated a ‘social 
capital’ of shared norms and collective action that made governments more responsive to the 
general welfare.257 Persson postulates that guilds in early modern European towns enabled 
conflicting groups to negotiate towards agreements that benefited all.258 Epstein contends that 
alliances between early modern rulers and powerful interest-groups such as guilds provided 
the centralized ‘coordination’ necessary to correct market failures.259  
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My previous publications have pointed out problems with this beneficent view of the political 
role of guilds. Guild-ruler interactions in pre-modern Europe were dominated by rent-seeking, 
through which guilds offered favours to officials and princes in return for legal privileges that 
would secure their monopoly rents, at the expense of other social groups and the wider 
economy.260 Evidence for most pre-modern guilds confirms that they devoted considerable 
resources to influencing the political process. The guilded weavers in my German case study, 
for instance, allocated substantial quantities of guild funds, personal resources, time, and 
effort to lobby the Württemberg state with the aim of securing and expanding their own 
privileges and attacking those of others.261 European comparisons suggest that it was where 
the political authorities were incapable of offering enforcement of corporate privileges, or 
gained greater economic and political benefit from permitting their evasion, that guilds 
weakened, metamorphosed, or disappeared.262 
 
Evidence of costly guild lobbying, and the favours the state granted in return, casts doubt on 
the view that guilds made politics work in ways that benefited the common weal. Well-
organized corporate groups such as guilds were in a position to offer – or deny – political 
cooperation and fiscal support to rulers in exchange for policy favours. Such favours often 
seemed harmless or even – if guild rhetoric was to be credited – generally beneficial, and had 
the inestimable benefit of being costless to the ruler, at least in the short term. It is difficult 
even for modern governments to resist limiting trade now in return for a lump-sum payment 
from a producer interest group, even though this undermines economic growth and thus tax 
revenues in future. The favours which guilds obtained from pre-modern rulers reduced 
economic efficiency, and the favours which rulers obtained from guilds reduced political 
efficiency. The interaction between guilds and rulers was malign rather than beneficent.263 
 
Epstein denies this. He claims that any welfare loss from guild rent-seeking must have been 
quantitatively insignificant. He then contradicts himself by claiming that guild rent-seeking 
did have significant effects, but that they were positively beneficial. Guild rent-seeking, he 
claims, generated political externalities that enabled early modern states to ‘coordinate’ the 
behaviour of ‘decentralized agents’, thereby making economies work more efficiently.  
 
5.1. Was the Welfare Loss from Guild Rent-Seeking Trivial? 
 
To make plausible his denial that the welfare loss from guild rent-seeking can have been 
quantitatively significant, Epstein disputes the findings of my German case study. His claim is 
that the deadweight losses inflicted by the worsted-weavers’ guild of the District of Wildberg 
on the Württemberg economy must equal the monopoly rent enjoyed by the guild members, 
which in turn can be measured by the annual per capita expenditure of this guild on lobbying. 
Since the per capita annual lobbying expenditure did not equal a large percentage of an 
average weaver’s per capita annual income, Epstein argues, this implies that the deadweight 
loss to the economy must have been low.264 
 
This is seriously confused. First, the deadweight loss a guild monopolist inflicts on the 
economy is quite distinct from the monopoly rents of guild members, and may be either larger 
or smaller than them.265 The relative size of the deadweight loss and the monopoly profits 
depend upon the shape of the demand curve over the range of prices and quantities traded 
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under the monopoly. Thus we learn nothing about the size of deadweight loss imposed by a 
guild monopoly by measuring the monopoly rents enjoyed by the guild members. 
 
Second, lobbying costs will only equal monopoly profits if there are many competing 
lobbyists trying to secure those monopoly profits by lobbying. If this condition is not met, 
then the lobbying costs incurred will typically be lower, and possibly very much lower, than 
the monopoly profits. This condition was not, of course, met in the case of a craft guild, since 
it was the only entity claiming a particular monopoly in a particular jurisdiction. Since in the 
District of Wildberg there was only a single lobbyist (the Wildberg guild) trying to secure that 
set of monopoly profits by lobbying, it was in a position to offer a much smaller amount to 
purchase the monopoly, which the monopoly-granting body (in this case the Duke of 
Württemberg) would be willing to accept since he would receive no competing offers to drive 
the price up.266 
 
5.2. Was Guild Rent-Seeking Positively Beneficial? 
 
Having thus established, to his satisfaction, that the quantitative effect of guild rent-seeking 
was trivial, Epstein turns around to claim that it was far from trivial – but good. Guild rent-
seeking, he says, produced political externalities that enabled early modern states to 
‘coordinate’ the behaviour of ‘decentralized agents’, thereby making ‘thin’ markets work 
better.  
 
He begins by denying that ‘all rent-seeking causes a net welfare loss’.267 Let us consider this 
possibility. Monopolies not only transfer resources from consumers to monopolists; they 
cause deadweight losses – resources that no-one can enjoy – by reducing the total amount that 
is produced and traded. This is the classic welfare loss due to monopoly. But on top of that, 
there is an additional welfare loss that arises because of efforts to obtain the monopoly – i.e. 
from rent-seeking. First, there are the efforts and expenditures of the potential recipients of 
the monopoly – in this case, the guild masters. Second, there are the efforts and expenditures 
of rulers and  officials to obtain or react to the expenditures of the potential recipients of the 
monopoly. Third, there are third-party distortions induced by the monopoly itself or by the 
government as a consequence of rent-seeking activity. An example of the latter would be if 
granting the monopoly brought extra tax revenue to the government, and this led to a 
competition among other interest-groups in the economy to capture some of these resources 
for themselves, e.g. through subsidies or tax breaks. The welfare loss from monopoly 
therefore consists not just of deadweight loss because less is produced and traded, but of 
resources which are expended in seeking to capture a share of the monopoly rents or to react 
to their existence in some other way.268  
 
The only way to wriggle out of the inescapable logic whereby rent-seeking does cause a net 
welfare loss is to claim the existence of special conditions whereby rent-seeking creates some 
sort of positive externality to compensate for welfare losses due to deadweight costs and rent-
seeking. This may be what Epstein is trying to claim. To impose some coherence on his 
somewhat jumbled argument, it appears to consist of the following four propositions. First, 
early modern markets were ‘thin’ which, Epstein says, meant that ‘decentralized agents’ 
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needed to be ‘coordinated’. Second, this centralized coordination required state intervention 
in the form of ‘fiscal, political, military and economic policy’. Third, the early modern state 
could only intervene by striking bargains with rent-seeking groups such as guilds. And fourth, 
the benefits of these interventions constituted a positive social externality which made up for 
the welfare loss from guild monopolies and rent-seeking.269  
 
Epstein offers no evidence for this unlikely scenario, however, nor does he even attempt to 
define key terms such as ‘thin’. And of course he neglects the countervailing impact of 
rapacious taxation, devastating warfare, oligarchical confiscation, and blundering 
mercantilism. Were states that granted rents to guilds particularly effective coordinators? Did 
the benefits of state coordination outweigh the costs of monopolies and rent-seeking? An 
example would have been helpful. 
 
If granting rents to guilds had created a positive institutional externality, then industries with 
guilds should have performed better than industries without. Instead, those worsted textile 
industries with alternative institutional structures flourished, while those regulated by guilds 
stagnated or declined. Further doubt is cast by evidence on the growth of the state in early 
modern Europe. Broadly speaking, Europe shows two distinct patterns of state formation. In 
the ‘particularist’ or ‘corporatist’ pattern, pursued by most central and southern European 
states, rulers accomplished the fiscal, military, bureaucratic and regulatory revolutions by 
granting privileges to rent-seeking interest-groups. In the ‘universalist’ pattern of state 
growth, pursued by the Dutch before c. 1670, by the English, and gradually by other emerging 
early modern states in the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, governments 
increased their powers by breaking down the privileges of rent-seeking interest groups.270 
When it came to mobilizing economies of scale, increasing the costs of collusion, and 
enforcing clearer rules and procedures for contract enforcement – all required for the 
economy to work better – the ‘particularist’ pattern of state formation systematically failed 
compared to the ‘universalist’ pattern. This is reflected in the empirical outcome. If the 
‘particularist’ pattern whereby states granted rents to guilds had created the positive 
externalities posited by Epstein, German economies in which guilds obtained state 
enforcement of their rent-seeking privileges over nearly every branch of industry and services 
should have been the richest, fastest-growing, and most innovative in Europe. Instead, 
German economies were economic backwaters compared to England and the Netherlands, 
where guild rent-seeking largely failed, many industries were unguilded, guilds in other 
branches were forced to metamorphose to survive, and ‘decentralized agents’ pursued most of 
their economic activities without centralized ‘coordination’, making use of impersonal market 
and legal mechanisms rather than the ‘personalized’ privileges accruing to corporate interest 
groups.271  
 
There is thus no support for the claim that guilds benefited the pre-modern European 
economy by improving economic policy and making the political system work more 
efficiently.  
 
6. Do European Comparisons Show that Strong Guilds Meant Strong Economies? 
 
The desire to associate strong guilds with economic success has motivated enthusiasts for 
guilds to seek to reverse prevailing views of guild strength across different European 
societies. England and the Netherlands are usually regarded having experienced a gradual 
weakening of guild regulation from the mid-sixteenth century onward, with some guilds 
disappearing altogether while others were compelled to relax their economic regulations and 
metamorphose into primarily cultural or social associations in order to survive. Guilds in 
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eastern Europe are also thought to have been comparatively weak because their ability to 
enforce their economic regulations was constrained by the power of the great feudal landlords 
under serfdom. Guilds in central and southern Europe, by contrast, are viewed as having been 
relatively strong, and as having maintained or even increased enforcement of their economic 
privileges and regulations into the late eighteenth or even the nineteenth century. 
 
But this picture is inconvenient to the case for guilds as economically beneficial institutions, 
which must then explain why guilds were strong in the comparatively stagnant economies of 
central and southern Europe but relatively weak in the ‘miracle economies’ of England and 
the Netherlands. This has led enthusiasts for guilds to seek to overturn the accepted picture. A 
first approach is to claim that the strong guilds observed in stagnant central European 
economies – such as those analyzed in my German case study – were ‘atypical’. A second 
strategy is to claim that English and Dutch guilds were after all ‘strong’, and can therefore be 
associated with economic success. Both these approaches, however, since they find 
themselves unable to change the facts, proceed by redefining ‘strong’ and ‘weak’. 
 
6.1. Were the Strong Württemberg Guilds Atypical? 
 
In order to associate strong guilds with strong economies, enthusiasts for guilds seek to argue 
that the strong guilds of central and southern Europe – one example of which was analyzed in 
my Württemberg case study – were ‘atypical’ and hence can be discarded from European 
comparisons. This is done by re-defining ‘strong’ so that it can equally describe an English or 
a Dutch guild. ‘Strong’ has traditionally been taken to mean ‘exerting political influence’. 
Soly, for instance, writes that ‘Guilds are often described as “powerful” or “weak”, based 
primarily on their measure of political influence ... in conjunction with the extent to which the 
members of these organizations could regulate the occupation; “powerful” guilds could 
impose penalties on those who violated the regulations’.272 My own writings follow this 
usage. Thus my 2004 article defines guild weakness explicitly as follows: ‘It was where the 
political authorities were incapable of offering enforcement of corporate privileges, or gained 
greater economic and political benefit from permitting them to be evaded, that guilds 
weakened, metamorphosed, or disappeared.’273 Epstein, however, takes exception to this 
standard usage, calling it an ‘underdetermined and misunderstood’ concept of guild 
‘weakness’. But then he also gets it wrong. He claims that I adopt a definition of guild 
weakness according to which ‘innovative (and thus in [Ogilvie’s] view ‘weak’) guilds were 
subordinated to powerful merchants and clothiers’.274 In fact, as the above quotation 
illustrates, I follow the traditional usage.275  
 
Falsely claiming that I define ‘weak’ as ‘subordinated to merchants’, Epstein then falsely 
denies that the Württemberg guilds can have been strong, since they were ‘very much under 
the thumb of the Calw merchants’.276 But an industry with a craftsmen’s guild that was not 
weak (in the sense that it could enforce its economic privileges and regulations) could easily 
have merchants who were also not weak. Indeed, in most strongly guilded European 
economies – including, but not restricted to, Württemberg – both craftsmen and merchants 
possessed guild organizations. Strong craftsmen’s guilds and strong merchant guilds were 
more likely to coexist than to exterminate one another.277 Indeed, as Soly has pointed out, 
‘Merchants did not ordinarily oppose setting up formal craft guilds, provided that these 
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organizations served their purposes. Restricting commercial competition was a constant 
concern of all those who traded export goods....’278 Although Epstein claims that ‘a “weak” 
guild is an oxymoron, since craft guilds would have had no reason to exist once they lost their 
rent streams to merchants and clothiers’,279 the argument is untenable: two well-organized 
interest groups can readily collude to share a pool of monopoly rents which they obtain 
through legal privileges, at the expense of outsiders and the wider economy. The 
Württemberg guilds were thus ‘strong’ according to the definition adopted in the wider 
historiography: they were able to enforce their economic regulations and to penalize those 
who violated them.280 They cannot be dismissed as examples of strong guilds merely by 
redefining the term ‘strong’. 
 
A second strategy pursued by enthusiasts is to dismiss the strong Württemberg guilds – and 
their dysfunctional economic activities – as ‘atypical’. Epstein, for instance, asserts that the 
Württemberg guilds were ‘fundamentally atypical’ and ‘seemingly singular’.281 Soly states 
that the guilded Württemberg worsted region cannot have been ‘typical of many European 
proto-industrial regions’.282 No specification provided of which features of Württemberg 
guilds are supposed to disqualify them from being a relevant test of the economic benefits of 
guilds, but the implication is that it is connected with the fact that their regulation extended to 
villages as well as towns.283  
 
This ignores the recent European historiography on guilds, however, which has revealed that 
there is nothing particularly unusual about urban guild regulation of rural producers. In most 
European industries, urban guilds in finishing occupations (e.g. dyers, fullers, shearers) or in 
marketing occupations (e.g. clothiers, merchants) had the power to compel rural producers in 
upstream occupations (e.g. weavers) to sell exclusively to urban guild members and to 
comply with some or all urban guild regulations. In many cases, urban guilds themselves 
extended partial or full guild regulation over practitioners of that craft in surrounding rural 
areas, compelling them to obey guild regulations or even obtain associate membership. 
Across broad regions of central and southern Europe, it was common for urban and rural 
producers to be combined into the same ‘regional’ guild. A final variant was the formation of 
exclusively rural guilds whose members were all villagers – the least frequently observed 
pattern, although by no means infrequent in central and southern Europe, and even 
occasionally observed in the Netherlands.284  
 
Guilds in most early modern European economies resembled those of Württemberg, 
therefore, in regulating craftsmen in rural as well as urban areas, either by including them as 
full members or by regulating their activities despite not requiring (or permitting) them to 
obtain guild membership. Urban guild regulation of rural craft production did not begin to 
wane in Switzerland until the mid-seventeenth century, in Scotland until the late seventeenth 
century, in France and Saxony until the early eighteenth century, in Spain, Austria and many 
German territories until the later eighteenth century, and in Sweden until the early nineteenth 
century. Urban guilds monopolized some (or all) stages of production in rural crafts in 
Switzerland, northern and central Italy, Catalonia, France, Sweden, Austria, Bohemia and 
Moravia – and this includes only industries for which detailed case studies are available. 
Finally, ‘regional’ (urban-rural) guilds or purely rural guilds were formed to regulate rural 
craft production in central and northern Italy, Spain, Austria, Bohemia, Bulgaria, Greece, and 
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many German territories.285 The recent guilds historiography has consequently begun 
increasingly to recognize the importance of guild regulation over the rural areas surrounding 
towns.286 What was atypical was the pattern observed in England and the Low Countries, 
where urban guilds were generally unable to exercise any regulation over craft producers in 
surrounding suburbs or villages.  
 
Nor do enthusiasts specify what it was about guilds that regulated rural as well as urban 
craftsmen that might disqualify them as a test case for guilds. It cannot have been spatial 
dispersion of guild members. For one thing, some scholars have argued that it was precisely 
the difficulty of monitoring spatially dispersed producers that made guilds particularly 
beneficial in rural craft production.287 For another, many rural industries were actually 
characterized by denser spatial agglomerations of practitioners than were traditional crafts, 
because they addressed an export demand that enabled larger numbers of producers to earn a 
living in one place than if they had sold only to local customers.288 Contemporaries did not 
view guilds which regulated partially rural crafts as being any different, either institutionally 
or economically, from those in locally-oriented, exclusively urban crafts.289 There is thus no 
analytical reason why a guild that regulated rural as well as urban craftsmen should not 
constitute a relevant test case for guilds. If guilds were economically beneficial, then guilds 
that were stronger and extended their powers spatially and demographically should surely 
have been even more beneficial.  
 
To dismiss all guilds other than the exclusively urban organizations of the northwest corner of 
Europe as ‘fundamentally atypical’ is convenient for guild enthusiasts, since it makes it 
possible to define the circumscribed guilds of England and the Netherlands as ‘typical’. But it 
is not justified by what we know from empirical research about the pattern of guild strength 
and weakness across pre-modern Europe. Guilds that were able to extend their regulatory 
capacities beyond traditional urban centres into the surrounding countryside were by no 
means atypical when we examine the guild landscape across the continent as a whole. Indeed, 
the ability of guilds to extend their reach beyond the town walls constituted an important 
enhancement to their ‘strength’, in the accepted sense of their ability to enforce their 
regulations and punish violations of them. Neither ‘strength’ nor ‘typicality’ can be redefined 
in such a way as to dismiss the vigorous and numerous guilds of economically stagnant 
regions of central, southern, and eastern-central Europe as ‘weak’ or ‘atypical’. 
 
6.2. Were English and Dutch Guilds Strong? 
 
These findings do not deter enthusiasts from proclaiming that it was actually the English and 
Dutch guilds that were ‘typical’ and ‘strong’. Admittedly, this runs into problems with the 
prevailing historiography, which regards English and Dutch guilds as having begun to relax 
their economic regulation in the sixteenth century, a long-drawn-out and regionally various 
process that took at least two centuries to complete. In England, around the middle of the 
sixteenth century, guilds disappeared altogether in some towns, failed to form at all in a large 
number of emerging ‘new towns’, proved unable to extend their powers into the countryside 
to regulate the rapidly proliferating rural industrial producers, and even in the old 
‘incorporated’ towns gradually lost their ability to conduct quality inspections, regulate 
production techniques, compel apprenticeship, prevent women’s work, or enforce entry 
restrictions. In the Netherlands, beginning in the 1560s, guilds began to be abolished and 
replaced with alternative institutions in some cities, failed to extend their regulation to the 
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burgeoning rural industries, and in those cities where they survived gradually found 
themselves compelled to relax their regulation of quality, techniques, apprenticeship and entry 
restrictions in order to remain in existence. After c. 1670, Dutch guilds are regarded as having 
recouped some of their powers, but still remained liberal compared to those elsewhere in 
Europe, in the sense that they were more open to immigrants, more liberal toward women’s 
work, more flexible in regulating apprentices and journeymen, and even sometimes – 
uniquely in Europe – admitted Jews.  
 
In seeking to overturn this picture, enthusiasts for guilds have overstated the prevailing 
historiography on English and Dutch guilds in order to oppose it more plausibly. Thus Epstein 
accuses me of claiming that ‘English craft guilds had disappeared’ by 1700.290 In fact, my 
article merely states that in England and the Low Countries ‘guilds remained limited to urban 
crafts, were generally weakened and circumvented even in towns from the sixteenth century 
onwards, and were often faced with a stark choice between metamorphosis and extinction’.291 
There is no claim that English and Dutch guilds ‘disappeared’, but simply that they did not 
regulate rural production and gradually relaxed their controls over urban production. The 
process of gradual weakening began in the sixteenth century, but was by no means complete 
before 1700. 
 
In order to claim that English and Dutch guilds were ‘strong’, enthusiasts for guilds have 
focussed on surviving guilds and guild activities that continued, while turning a blind eye to 
guilds that were abolished, guild activities that died out, and the signs of decline already 
manifested by some sixteenth-century guilds. On England, for instance, Epstein claims that 
‘most early modern economic historians’ agree that guilds declined in the seventeenth 
century, or in the 1720s or 1730s, or in the second half of the eighteenth century.292 He fails to 
refer to the large number of case studies which present findings on English guilds that began 
to weaken in the sixteenth century.293 The highly variegated chronology of guild decline that 
can be found in different strands of the English historiography reflects the fact that different 
English guilds declined at different paces, and that decline manifested itself earlier in some 
guild activities (e.g. outlawing rural industry, carrying out workshop ‘searches’, enforcing 
universal apprenticeship) than in others (e.g. collecting dues from masters, registering those 
who chose to undertake apprenticeships).  
 
Closer investigation reveals that enthusiasts for guilds have exaggerated even the two works – 
by Snell and Walker – to which they most often appeal to support their idea that English 
guilds remained strong in the eighteenth century. Snell’s 1985 book, for instance, states 
explicitly that ‘there has been considerable disagreement among historians’ about when guild 
apprenticeships and guilds went into decline in England. Lack of knowledge about the 
regional diversity of guilds, the differing chronology of guilds’ relaxation of monopolistic 
restrictions, and the highly various enforcement of guild apprenticeship, according to Snell, 
mean that ‘the debate is indeed in a chaotic state’. Snell himself makes no claim to settle all 
these disagreements, setting out solely to ‘make clearer some of the major chronologies and 
components of change affecting the apprenticeship system’. That is, Snell does not argue that 
guilds continued strong throughout England into the later eighteenth century, but rather that in 
parts of provincial England outside London apprenticeship did not fully decline until that 
period.294 As we have seen, much apprenticeship, especially in England, took place outside 
the guild framework. Guild regulation disappeared in this period from many important and 
expanding industries, even while non-guild apprenticeship survived as a voluntary contract 
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between individuals or a coercive contract imposed by welfare authorities on pauper children 
and unwilling masters. Snell admits explicitly that his work addresses the issue of 
apprenticeship decline in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but not the question of 
what happened in the sixteenth century: ‘debate may continue on the century after 1563 ... 
These earlier changes do not concern me here, but it may be that there was an earlier stage of 
decline, and that this has contributed to the muddled historiography’.295 
 
The other English study most often cited by enthusiasts for guilds is Walker’s unpublished 
doctoral dissertation of 1985, on which Snell also relies. Counter to the claims of enthusiasts, 
Walker’s dissertation does not establish that eighteenth-century English guilds were strong 
compared either to guilds elsewhere in Europe or to their sixteenth-century predecessors. On 
the contrary, he states explicitly that he does not compare English guilds with those in other 
European countries and that he does not have any empirical findings for England in the period 
before his own primary research starts in 1660.296 The few undisputed facts that emerge from 
Walker’s brief literature survey for the pre-1660 period297 confirm that many components of 
the English guild system did begin to weaken in the sixteenth century. As Walker explicitly 
admits,  
Urban guilds and trading companies were increasingly by-passed during and before 
our period of study by the growth of industries in the countryside, and of new 
industrial or dockyard towns. Guilds were extant in incorporated towns of the older 
urban order. Usually these were larger towns. There were many smaller 
unincorporated towns and mere villages without a guild structure. Not all industry or 
trade was guild-controlled by any means.298 
Walker also acknowledges that even those guilds that survived in the ‘incorporated towns of 
the older urban order’ were compelled to metamorphose in order to survive, and refers 
repeatedly to ‘guild flexibility and a continual process of degeneration and regeneration’.299  
 
Walker’s own data for the 1660-1820 period are too weak to support the conclusion that 
English guilds remained strong into the eighteenth century. For one thing, by their nature his 
data are biased in favour of towns with strong guilds, since many English towns have few or 
no surviving guild records. In order to carry out his analysis, Walker had to select towns with 
better than average surviving guild records, but that made it likely that they were towns in 
which guilds themselves survived longer than average.300 For another, Walker’s data relate 
almost exclusively to numbers of masters and apprentices.301 What matters for the issue of 
guild decline is not whether people went on being members of guilds, but what those guilds 
did.  
 
Studies that do analyse what English guilds did demonstrate that in most relevant respects 
they began to diminish enforcement of their economic regulations and privileges from the 
later sixteenth century on, even though they remained formally in existence and continued to 
organize charitable, sociable, and cultural activities into the eighteenth century. This is the 
finding that emerges from the work of Kellett on the decline of the London Livery 
Companies,302 Randall on the woollen weavers of Gloucestershire,303 Heaton on the woollen 
and worsted weavers of Yorkshire,304 Smith on the openness of the York Merchant Taylors’ 
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Company to female membership,305 and Wallis on control of quality and apprenticeship in the 
London Livery Companies,306 among many other admirable case studies. The English 
historiography – whether traditional or more recent – shows clearly that many (if not all) 
English guilds reduced the intensity of their economic regulation from the sixteenth century 
on, even while many (though not all) of them continued to pursue a diminished range of 
activities and remain formally in existence into the eighteenth century. 
 
The same can be said for guilds in the Low Countries, although the historiography is more 
complex for two reasons. First, as already mentioned, guilds developed differently in the 
Northern and Southern Netherlands after the Dutch Revolt of the 1560s. Second, the 
weakening of guilds during the Dutch Golden Age (c. 1550 - c. 1670) was followed by a 
degree of tightening after 1670, the period during which the Northern Netherlands, while 
remaining wealthy, moved gradually into slower economic growth, culminating in stagnation 
in the eighteenth century and a surprisingly late onset of industrialization in the nineteenth.307 
Nonetheless, many aspects of the relaxation of guild controls in the sixteenth century 
remained in being and were not reversed after 1650. These included the abolition of guilds in 
much of the textile industry, the lack of guild control over rural producers, the absence of 
tramping requirements for journeymen, the openness to immigrants, and the extraordinary 
liberality toward women.  
 
All that enthusiasts for guilds can present to counter these many indications of loosening, 
which were not reversed after 1670, is the fact that new guilds continued to be formed in the 
Netherlands in that period. Epstein, for instance, claims that in the Netherlands ‘a strong 
expansion in the number and significance of guilds coincided with economic growth and 
innovation in the seventeenth century’.308 But the references cited in the footnote to this 
statement merely provide evidence on the number of guilds that existed,309 not what degree of 
economic regulation those guilds could enforce, the relevant issue in assessing their strength 
or weakness. This is acknowledged by other scholars such as Soly, who points out that in the 
Northern Netherlands in the sixteenth century ‘spectacular urban growth coincided with an 
equally impressive rise in the number of corporative organizations, but primarily outside the 
export trades, and, except for towns in the eastern provinces, master artisans did not have 
direct political input anywhere’.310 Anyone who has read the content of Dutch guild studies 
will be aware that their economic regulation was comparatively ‘weak’ by European 
standards, especially after the 1560s. Furthermore, even if there had been an association 
between growth in the numbers of guilds and growth in the economy,311 it does not imply that 
guild foundations led to economic growth. The converse could as easily be the case, with 
prosperity attracting rent-seeking aiming to redistribute more of the gains of prosperity toward 
guild masters.312 Guilds in the Dutch Republic were so much more liberal than those of its 
nearest competitors that the Dutch economy could remain prosperous even as it gradually 
moved, after 1670, toward a greater degree of politically licensed rent-seeking than had 
occurred during its Golden Age. 
 
The extraordinarily liberal regulatory regime operated by early modern Dutch guilds emerges 
from all aspects of their operations. Dutch guilds were well known for admitting more female 
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entrants and permitting more women’s work than most European guilds, even many in 
England.313 Some Dutch guilds even admitted Jews, a liberality perpetrated by no other guilds 
in Europe. Dutch guilds were relatively open to non-citizens of the urban community. Dutch 
guilds did not require journeymen to tramp. Dutch guilds rarely regulated producers in the 
surrounding countryside, and only 4 per cent of Dutch guilds were rural. And in some of the 
most important and innovative industrial cities – particularly the key textile centre of Leiden – 
guilds were abolished in the 1560s and replaced (a generation later) by organs of the 
municipal government called ‘neringen’ which regulated whole branches of industry in ways 
that dispensed with many of the entry restrictions enforced even by the relatively open Dutch 
guilds.314  
 
Especially in the textile industry – the most important industry in the early modern Dutch 
economy, and one of the most successful and innovative in Europe – guilds were either 
altogether abolished or significantly weakened from the 1560s onward, and did not recover 
their strength or autonomy after 1670. Thus Soly’s recent account of the Dutch textile 
industry explicitly emphasizes its lack of guild regulation: 
The overwhelming majority of the textile producers in the United Provinces, 
employers and employees alike, operated outside the corporative context. Only a tiny 
minority of the thousands of manual artisans working for the new drapery in Leiden, 
the most important textile centre, belonged to a craft guild. Nor were the wool 
weavers and silk weavers in Amsterdam, the linen bleachers in Haarlem, the cloth 
weavers in Delft, or the producers of serges and fustians in Gouda organized in 
guilds. ... Nearly the entire textile industry in Leiden was organized in neringen 
(trades). All persons involved in manufacturing a certain product automatically 
belonged to these neringen: there was no regular membership, with conditions for 
joining and the right to withdraw. The same or similar institutions existed in 
Amsterdam, Haarlem, Delft, and Gouda and were supervised by the municipal 
authorities there as well.315 
According to Soly, even in those Dutch textile industries that did remain guilded, the guild 
organizations were very weak, with little autonomous economic control for the guilds 
themselves and most decisions being taken by the urban authorities: 
Wherever branches of the textile industry were guild-based, the master artisans had 
no real decision-making authority. They would be consulted, and in most cases their 
recommendations would be taken (especially concerning technical matters), but the 
local authorities were in full control. The authorities used the corporative 
organizations, where they appointed those in charge, as instruments for protecting 
economic and/or fiscal interests that did not necessarily top the agendas of the master 
artisans. 316 
 
Despite evidence such as this, some enthusiasts for guilds continue to portray Dutch guilds as 
‘strong’ by European standards and as responsible for Dutch economic success. Epstein is 
forced to admit that Leiden’s innovative and successful textile industry was not guilded, but 
then tries to argue that this does not weaken the case for guilds since Leiden’s industry was 
regulated by the municipal organizational framework of the ‘nering’.317 But as the Dutch 
historiography makes abundantly clear, ‘neringen’ were not the same as guilds.318 ‘Neringen’ 
were administrative organs established in each branch of industry by the Leiden city council 
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around 1585, nearly a quarter of a century after the abolition of the drapers’ guild in 1561. 
Unlike guilds, ‘neringen’ included everyone (including non-citizens): they did not strictly 
speaking have any ‘members’, but rather regulated all persons concerned in a particular 
industrial branch (including non-masters). ‘Neringen’ were not administered by craft masters 
but by ‘governors’ appointed by the political authorities, often assisted by merchants and 
entrepreneurs. The prevalence of ‘neringen’ in many important Dutch textile industries is 
certainly interesting, but for precisely opposite reasons to those adduced by Epstein. They 
show that innovation and training were provided in highly successful industries from the 
sixteenth century onward through ‘impersonal’ institutions administered by the public 
authorities rather than ‘personalized’ institutions such as guilds. This is precisely the lesson 
drawn by mainstream Dutch scholars:  
technological innovation in the Dutch Republic would – other things being equal – 
not have taken a much different course if there had been no craft guilds at all, because 
the role of guilds in technological advance could also be fulfilled by other sorts of 
institutions and arrangements. There were sufficient alternatives available.319 
 
To summarize, although guilds continued to exist in some sectors of the English and Dutch 
economies until the end of the eighteenth century, they weakened significantly in the 
sixteenth century and remained weaker than in most other European economies thereafter. 
Guilds did not even exist in all English and Dutch towns. Those urban guilds that did exist in 
England and the Northern Netherlands had little or no power over rural producers, and there 
were almost no rural or ‘regional’ guilds. Even in the towns in which they persisted, English 
and Dutch guilds had to metamorphose in order to survive. Although guilds varied across 
different towns within England and the Netherlands, in general guilds began to relax their 
entry barriers progressively from the sixteenth century on. English and Dutch guilds began to 
admit women, non-citizens and other outsiders to a much greater extent than those in most 
other European societies. They were forced to tolerate widespread evasion of their 
apprenticeship regulations. Trademark and quality disputes were increasingly submitted to the 
ordinary public law courts rather than to guild jurisdiction. Industrial regulation – including of 
quality, training, and technology – was increasingly a matter of private decision-making by 
individual producers, within a regulatory framework provided by impersonal public 
institutions. English and Dutch guilds consequently were forced to act liberally – compared to 
those in many other European economies – in permitting both members and outsiders to 
introduce new products, new techniques, and new practices. Most historians describe how 
English guilds gradually shifted from economic regulation to cultural display and sociability 
from the sixteenth century on. Thus even though guilds continued to exist in parts of the 
English and Dutch economies, they cannot be characterized as ‘strong’, compared either to 
their sixteenth-century predecessors or to their contemporary cognates in most other parts of 
Europe. 
 
7. What Approaches and Methodologies Are Best for Understanding the Role of Guilds? 
 
What most distinctly characterizes the approach adopted by enthusiasts for guilds is its 
willingness to assume a kind of universal teleology: whatever existed must have been there 
because it was economically beneficial. Thus ‘the extraordinary longevity of the craft guild’ 
arose from its beneficial functions in solving information asymmetries, controlling quality, 
and ensuring human capital investment.320 Guilds, according to their enthusiasts, ‘prospered 
for more than half a millennium because they sustained specialized interregional labour 
markets and contributed to technological invention’.321 The ‘extraordinarily long persistence’ 
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of the craft guild arose from the fact that consumers, communities, and governments 
recognized its benefits and promoted its existence.322  
 
This teleological view of guilds is an example of a wider approach to economic institutions 
increasingly popular among certain groups of economists and economic historians – what is 
known as the ‘efficiency’ theory of institutions. According to this view, an institution exists to 
address the economic needs of a society. It is a solution to some problem that is preventing 
people from achieving higher production and consumption. Typically, this is a problem with 
transaction costs – ‘search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and 
enforcement costs’.323 If these costs are too high, potentially profitable activities will not take 
place. So individuals and societies experiment with institutional arrangements to solve these 
problems.324 They choose those arrangements that most efficiently solve problems of 
transaction costs because such institutions ‘yield a stream of benefits which makes it 
profitable to undergo the costs of innovating this new organizational form’.325 As social 
scientists, all we have to do is identify the particular economic problem that needs to be 
solved, and we will understand why that institution exists. Any society, this view holds, will 
get the institutions that are most efficient in addressing its requirements. When these 
requirements change, institutions will also change. 
 
This approach was first popularized in economic history in the 1970s with North and 
Thomas’s model of the ‘Rise of the Western World’, according to which serfdom was ‘an 
efficient solution to the existing problems’ in medieval economies – a voluntary contract 
between peasants who provided labour services to lords in exchange for ‘the public good of 
protection and justice’.326 But the efficiency approach was soon applied by other scholars to 
other historical institutions. McCloskey postulated that the medieval village – particularly its 
open field system – was an efficient institution for diversifying risks in the absence of markets 
for insurance, given peasant risk-aversion.327 Greif, Milgrom and Weingast hypothesized that 
medieval merchant guilds, by threatening collective boycotts of rulers who failed to provide 
commercial security, sustained ‘the efficient level of trade’.328 Carlos and Nicholas claimed 
that the monopolistic chartered trading companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
were efficient institutions for solving information asymmetries and principal-agent problems 
in early modern long-distance trade.329 Nugent and Sanchez reinterpreted the Spanish Mesta, a 
guild-like association of shepherds and sheep-owners, as an efficient solution to the high cost 
of building fences to define property rights.330 Volckart argued that the medieval noble feud 
was an institution for enhancing economic efficiency by turning ‘the one-shot Prisoner’s 
Dilemmas posed by non-simultaneous transactions between strangers into iterated games 
where the cheated party had the chance to punish the defector’, thereby securing property 
rights and contract enforcement in long-distance trade.331 Even vigilante justice and lynching 
have been rehabilitated by some scholars as efficient solutions to inadequate contract 
enforcement in pre-modern societies.332 By now, enthusiasts have reinterpreted pretty well 
every pre-modern institution in terms of efficiency – as beneficial solutions to one or more 
obstacles to possible transactions. When economic conditions changed so that these 
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institutions were no longer efficient, they were replaced by new institutions that were once 
again efficient under the new conditions.  
 
The proliferation of such theoretical approaches to economic institutions seems to have 
persuaded enthusiasts that they can rehabilitate the pre-modern craft guild on the grounds that 
any long-lasting institution must be efficient. That conclusion, they appear to think, is self-
evident and needs no further argument or evidence to support it. We are told that there is now 
a ‘modern consensus’ about the economic benefits of guilds, from which no-one may now 
deviate. According to Epstein, ‘a large body of modern literature’ regards European craft 
guilds as having generated aggregate economic benefits.333 To criticize guilds, he claims, is to 
misrepresent ‘modern international scholarship’.334 The ‘modern research and consensus on 
craft guilds’, he claims, is that they were economically beneficial solutions to underdeveloped 
factor markets.335 But surely a ‘modern consensus’ that assumes economic efficiency to be the 
only possible explanation for institutions deserves to be questioned.  
 
There are at least three other ways to explain institutions.336 Some historians think chance 
played the main role: incidental occurrences and individual actions, magnified by path 
dependency, shape institutional development – as in the case of non-European economies 
whose modern legal systems reflect the accident of which European power first colonized 
them.337 Other historians rely more on cultural explanations: societies hold different beliefs 
and values, and these motivate people to follow different institutional rules – which can 
therefore be very difficult to transplant from one culture to another.338 And third, some 
historians think institutions tend to develop so as to serve the interests of those who wield the 
most power in their societies. Institutions affect both the size of the total economic pie and 
who gets how big a slice. Most people in the economy might well want the pie to be as big as 
possible – the assumption of the efficiency theorists. But people will typically disagree about 
how to share out the slices, and thus differ about which institutions are ‘best’. This causes 
conflict. Which institution (or set of institutions) results from this conflict will be affected not 
just by its efficiency but by its distributional implications for the most powerful individuals 
and groups.339 I have argued that this approach can best explain why craft guilds were 
widespread in Europe for many centuries – not because they were good for the entire 
economy, but because they benefited well-organized interest groups. They made the pie 
smaller, but dished out large slices to established male masters, with fiscal and regulatory 
side-benefits to town governments and princes.340  
 
There is no self-evident, a priori reason to assume any of these explanations in advance of 
any empirical evidence – let alone a teleological ‘efficiency’ view that believes any institution 
must have existed to benefit the whole economy. Only evidence can decide among these 
possible explanations. And what kind of evidence can reveal the specific role of an institution 
in its overall social and economic context? For this, we must be able to see the institution at 
work on the local level, at the point of contact. We need, in other words, to focus on a specific 
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economy, region, or industry in which a particular institution played a role, searching out all 
possible documentary sources recording how that community worked, combining quantitative 
and qualitative data on it into an interlinked database, building only concepts licensed by 
direct evidence.341 The detailed findings for that particular region or industry can then be 
compared with those from other empirical case studies of this kind, preferably some with and 
some without the institution in question, or a range of cases in which the institution under 
analysis was stronger, weaker, or altogether absent.  
 
Some enthusiasts for guilds object to this approach. Epstein seeks to discredit my more 
critical view of guilds by claiming it is based on ‘a single (arguably singular) case study’.342 
He also criticizes my method of comparing findings for a specific worsted industry with those 
for other worsted industries across Europe, describing it as ‘analytical confusion’, without 
revealing what he has in mind.343 And yet he complains that we do not know much about total 
guild numbers, membership, income distribution, productivity, incidence of apprenticeship, 
features of apprenticeship, cost of lobbying, returns to lobbying, cooperation between guilds 
and the state, and technological innovation.344 But what sort of knowledge does he imagine? 
A substantial number of case studies across Europe (including my own) provide detailed 
information about these precise issues. Thus my study documents changes over time in the 
precise numbers of guilds in the Württemberg worsted industry,345 the size of membership of 
each guild at different periods in the industry’s history,346 the annual per capita output of guild 
masters and the constraints on it,347 the incidence of apprenticeship,348 the institutional and 
technological features of apprenticeship,349 the costs of lobbying and its returns in terms of 
favourable legislation,350 the relationship between guilds and the state,351 and the relationship 
of the guild with technological innovation.352 If enthusiasts for guilds know of other kinds or 
sources of evidence about the actual (rather than an imagined) role of institutions in European 
societies, they owe us a description of these sources, and some hints about where to find 
them.353 
 
Nor is even their ‘modern consensus’ very widespread, as even the most cursory glance at 
empirical work in adjacent fields shows – the history of technology,354 women’s work,355 
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migration,356 Jewish occupations,357 illegitimacy,358 or economic marginalization,359 to name 
just a few – where guilds are assessed in more sober terms. Rigorous research into what 
guilds actually did, often using precisely the local case-study approach dismissed by Epstein, 
not only fails to confirm that guilds were beneficial, but comprehensively refutes it. Guilds 
were neither necessary nor sufficient for quality control, skills transmission, or technological 
innovation in pre-modern industry. Guilds encouraged a pernicious form of oligarchic rent-
seeking that caused welfare losses to the broader society, and there is no evidence that they 
generated any positive political externalities to compensate. Guilds were both economically 
inefficient and socially inequitable. They not only reduced the size of the economic pie, but 
distributed large shares to well-off male guild masters at the expense of consumers, 
employees, women, migrants, Jews, and other marginal groups whom they excluded from full 
participation in the pre-modern economy.  
 
We must not project our nostalgia for more ‘communitarian’ social arrangements – or a 
teleological belief in the economic efficiency of long-lasting institutions – on the European 
past or the modern Third World. This is both anachronistic and condescending. It also 
distracts from our fundamental challenge – that of understanding the economic foundations of 
human well-being. We should make no assumptions about these foundations – whether of 
efficiency or inefficiency. Instead, we should try to find out by detailed, painstaking research 
at the local level how things actually worked in practice. 
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